



**AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION
OF AIR PILOTS**



**Qantas LH EA 11
AFAP Explanatory Document
Updated April 2026**



Overview

It has now been over 5 months since this document was produced and released based on the agreed terms in the in-principle agreement. Once the final draft was released and the AFAP Qantas Pilot Council (QPC) Committee reviewed the final details, it made the determination that Qantas Long Haul Enterprise Agreement 11 (EA11) as it currently stands does not provide a fair or adequate proposal to Qantas Long Haul Pilots. **Accordingly, the QPC Committee recommended voting No on EA11.**

Rather than produce an entirely new document, the AFAP has elected to re-release this document with some amendments to account for the changes that occurred between the in-principle agreement and the final draft. This document should be read in conjunction with the updated summary of changes that has been released alongside it. Other changes have been highlighted throughout this document. The QPC Committee also encourages any members to re-acquaint yourself with the material you feel pertinent in order to make an educated and informed vote.

This explanatory document has been produced by the QPC Committee to assist members in making an informed decision regarding the proposed EA11 agreed between Qantas and AIPA.

The document explains the key elements of the proposed agreement, the mechanisms behind the major changes, and their likely implications for pilots at different career stages. It also outlines the procedural steps that would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful ballot and the risks involved.

The AFAP was not a party to the final in-principle agreement. However, in keeping with our commitment to transparency and informed decision-making, we have prepared this independent analysis so that members can assess the proposal in light of their individual circumstances.

Should any inconsistency exist between this explanatory material and the Enterprise Agreement itself, the EA document will prevail.

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Introduction

Background to Negotiations

Preparations for the Long Haul EA11 bargaining round began approximately 2 years ago. The AFAP's approach was guided by extensive member consultation and survey analysis that provided a clear picture of Qantas Long Haul pilot priorities.

The overriding concern identified by members was the need for a meaningful pay uplift relative to the work performed. This reflected both the impact of the COVID-19 stand-down period and the loss of purchasing power following significant post-COVID inflation.

Following remuneration, the next-highest priorities were:

1. **Fatigue mitigation and lifestyle improvements**, particularly for back-of-clock A330 operations and high-duty-hour long-range flying on the 787 and A350 fleets.
2. **Improvements to the B and C scales**, addressing inequities that have persisted for close to a decade; and
3. **Blank-lines and roster stability**: Addressing concerns around the regularity of blank-line rotation and the indiscriminate use abuse of carers lines.
4. **Commuter improvements**: Delivering improvements for commuters, acknowledging the reality that an increasing portion of pilots, particularly junior pilots, are forced to commute as a result of rising living costs in main bases.

These findings formed the foundation of the AFAP's log of claims and have remained central to our strategy throughout the negotiation process.



Negotiation Environment

Economic and Industrial Context

Throughout negotiations the AFAP has emphasised the broader economic realities facing Qantas Long Haul pilots. During the COVID-19 period, long haul pilots made significant personal and financial sacrifices to help keep Qantas viable. Many were stood down without pay for extended periods, while others, particularly junior pilots and second officers, were actively encouraged by the Company to take leave without pay. This arrangement not only excluded them from earning income during that time but also from accruing and using paid leave. These measures delivered major wage savings to Qantas, yet the cumulative losses to pilots have never been recovered. In the years since, sustained high inflation has further eroded real wages.

Since then, Australia has experienced elevated inflation at multi-decade highs, with price growth peaking in the post-COVID period and remaining above target for several years. The effect has been a marked erosion of purchasing power for households: everyday costs (housing, energy, insurance, groceries, services) have risen materially faster than typical wage growth, producing a sustained decline in real wages. In practical terms, even “headline” increases that appear sizeable in nominal terms can leave pilots worse off in real terms unless they keep pace with cumulative inflation over the life of the agreement.

Over the following years, Qantas has returned to record profitability. Across FY2023–FY2025 the Company reported a cumulative profit of approximately \$6.94 billion, including a \$2.465 billion underlying profit before tax in FY2023, the largest in its history, and a further \$2.078 billion in FY2024. These results have been accompanied by significant share buy-backs and shareholder returns. This context underscores the Company’s clear capacity to invest in its workforce and rebuild trust through fair, sustainable agreements.

Against this backdrop, the AFAP rejected the Company’s initial premise that a wage freeze was necessary. We made it clear that any nominal freeze could only be acceptable if it were fully offset by compounding uplift across the life of the agreement, ensuring no pilot was financially disadvantaged in real terms.

Negotiation Framework and Company Proposal

Formal bargaining commenced just over 18 months ago and began with Qantas' introduction of a proposed new wage-structure framework intended to apply across all fleets and ranks. While described by the Company as a simplification of legacy arrangements, the framework represents a complete redesign of pay progression for most LH operations, demanding careful long-term analysis.

The AFAP engaged constructively, recognising that reform was possible, but maintaining a clear focus on protecting pilot value, fatigue safety, and the integrity of agreement protections.

Our consistent position has been that reform cannot come at the expense of fairness or safety.

Political Context

Negotiations occurred under the current Federal Labor Government's industrial-relations framework, which includes strengthened worker protections, new wage-theft laws, and "same job, same pay" provisions. These reforms provide a more balanced environment for collective bargaining and reinforce the AFAP's confidence that reasonable, good-faith outcomes can be achieved without compromising established pilot safeguards.

Importantly, recent amendments to the Fair Work Act have also introduced Intractable Bargaining provisions. These provisions create a structured pathway for resolving negotiations that have reached genuine impasse, providing the Fair Work Commission with the power to make a binding determination on outstanding matters. This mechanism fundamentally changes the bargaining landscape by giving both parties access to an escalation process that prevents either side from indefinitely withholding agreement to gain leverage. In effect, it limits the capacity for either party to "hold the other hostage," promoting finality and encouraging genuine, good-faith engagement throughout the bargaining process.

Long Haul Operational Context

Operationally, Qantas Long Haul is undergoing a major transition. The introduction of the A350 fleet, the gradual retirement of the A380 and A330 within the next decade, and the expansion of both long-range and ultra-long-range flying will redefine the structure of the operation. Within this timeframe, the Qantas long haul fleet will likely consolidate around two core types: the A350 and the 787. The arrival of the 787-10s currently on order is



expected to shift the balance of the 787 network, with a greater proportion of 3-crew operations as aircraft are deployed on shorter-range missions.

While public discussion has largely focused on the A350's ultra-long-range (ULR) capability, this view is somewhat narrow. In practice, the A350 will replace much of the current A380 network, operating many of the same long-haul 4-crew sectors that are not necessarily classified as ULR. This transition will have a profound effect on fleet composition, crewing, and fatigue dynamics over the coming decade, and must be considered when assessing the long-term suitability of the EA11 framework.

Many of the existing EA10 work rules were developed using Qantas' internal fatigue risk management data and bio-mathematical modelling. However, this data has never been peer-reviewed and does not withstand independent scientific scrutiny. The underlying model used by Qantas is limited in both quality and scope; it relies heavily on theoretical assumptions and cannot accurately account for the variability and complexity of real-world long-haul operations. As a result, the AFAP believes several current work rules lack a credible evidence base and are increasingly inconsistent with contemporary fatigue science and operational experience.

The AFAP sought to address these issues as a matter of safety and crew health, and advised Qantas of our intention to fund a proper, published fatigue study capable of independent peer review.

EA11 has been framed by Qantas as a reform agreement, one intended to modernise pay structures and harmonise certain provisions across fleets by taking steps towards fleet pay, but it also introduces significant changes to rostering, contactability, and training provisions that carry material industrial implications.

Overview of the Company's EA11 Offer

Summary

The proposed Qantas Long Haul Enterprise Agreement 11 (EA11) covers a four-year nominal term from certification to 2029. Effectively this means the agreement would cover approximately 5.7 years when the expiry of EA 10 (April 2024 – 4 years from approval) is taken into account. It replaces EA10 and introduces a comprehensive redesign of pay and changes to crediting, divisors, duty travel entitlements, rostering mechanisms and various other reforms.

Pay Structure and Increments

- **Term:** 4 years from commencement.
- **Pay tables:** As per the included rate tables (revised hourly rates and step progressions). Commencing First Full Pay Period (FFPP) on or after 1 July 2026.
- **Increases:** Three compounding 3 % annual uplifts from July 2026 onward, following an **implementation allowance** of 15 credit hours per bid period (17 hours in the BP ending 12 July 2026). This payment will be a minimum of \$5000, meaning any pilot that will receive less than \$5000 based on the above credits will be 'topped up'.
- **Step progression:** Revised "years-in-rank/fleet" model; transition to higher year for A380 and A330 (in some circumstances) at implementation for pilots remaining in category. Any subsequent fleet or rank change resets to Year 1.
- **787 Night Credits:** 3 and 4 crew 1/3 night credits introduced. Planning divisor and MGH lifted to align with legacy fleets. Net affect = more credit hours for same duty hours. Caution must be taken however, as night credits are dependent on route structure and flight timing, which can be changed outside of the EA. They will also require increased days worked when rostered MDC patterns or standby to achieve MGH.
- **B & C Scale uplift:** Significant percentage increase at implementation, 4 year scale.
- **Legacy SOs:** Existing 12 year table remains, with 8.8% increase applied. Pilots with less than 12 years progress multiple increments each year.

Divisors and Credit Alignment

B787 divisor rules: MGH to 160, BP max divisor 180, Surge cap 185 twice per year (aligned with A380/A330); planning divisor default 172.5 (range 170–175 by agreement). MGH moves proportionally when divisor > 172.5.

Contactability and Contact Windows

- **Revised report-time requirements:** 15-4 call retained. Between 15 and 9 hours before departure a passive SMS/email contact may be made for delays > 15 minutes. From 9 hours prior, sign-on time fixed. Pilot may elect to choose to accept changes thereafter.

Training and TAFB

- **Freeze periods:** Two training blocks for promotion on type; A330↔A350 freeze reduced to two blocks (each direction).
- **Return of service limitation:** Clarified to apply when bidding for promotion.
- **Paired flying:** Restriction removed for all training; transitional training pay for FO/SO removed.
- **Freeze after LWOP return:** Four years if awarded higher category, 18 months if assigned lower.
- **TAFB allowance:** 200 km boundary removed (those outside 200km no longer eligible for any TAFB); Option 2B clarified; aligned with current SH EA.
- **Application of SH EA T&Cs on back-bid:** Applies from agreed training-path period (promulgated by Flight Training). Pay per SHEA cl 28.6, average divisors over previous six BPs of target category.
- **Sim support from standby:** May be allocated with ≥ 5 hours notice; excluded from open time and from command test/check, type rating test/check, ATPL test/check, Simulator instructor test/check or flight examiner rating test/check.
- **Classroom training:** Prescriptive requirements removed; 8-hour daily limit retained. **The amended clause does not define what classroom training encompasses (i.e. it may include EP's and other practical ground training), and specifically excludes breaks, therefore whist 'classroom time' may not exceed 8 hours, the duty may.**
- **Online training:** Passive payment 5 h 30 m (5.5 h) per FY; If training exceeds 8 hours per annum, training will be paid hour for hour. Calculation of online training paid based on annual 'weighted average' of courses required to be completed by Long Haul pilots per annum, e.g. credit for a 2-hour course required to be completed every 2 years would equal one hour credit. For purpose of calculation,

Qantas course timings to be used. Pro-rated from commencement to 30 June 2026; paid first full pay period after 1 July each year.

Rostering

- **Bid line construction:**
 - Increase the standard window to be -5 to +10 (non-standard window of -5 to +5 available)
 - Standard Window Floor of 155 with ceiling of max divisor +5
 - Personal divisor applicable to all pilots
- **Short line pattern protection**
 - Where credit hours are below MGH but equal to or greater than the bottom of the standard window, no ATA is applicable and MGH will be paid.
 - Where credit hours are below MGH and below the bottom of the standard window, ATA will apply only to the bottom of the standard window and MGH will be paid.
 - Where credit hours are above MGH but below the bottom of the standard window, fixed pattern protection will apply to the bottom of the standard window.
- **Calendar-Day Pattern Protection** replaces Pattern-Limited PP; definition removed where redundant.
- **Offsetable PP for travel-document delays:** applies when passport/visa awaiting approval (not pilot fault).
- **Blank Lines:** 5 h passive credit per full line (8 h if bid and allocated and not projected as a BLH per the final projected lines. This means pilots cannot bid with confidence knowing which payment they will receive); pro-rated for part BLH; paid via day 29 BP reconciliation. Carer's lines no longer excluded. Rotation PLH, PLH, BLH, PLH BLH applies on check-to-line.
- **One-way temporary base transfers:** Award only; seniority-based; 2 BP limit (mirror SHEA).
- **X day before SIM:** On the first day after the return from annual or long service leave, a pilot will be rostered an X day immediately preceding a recurrent simulator, unless otherwise agreed with the pilot
- **X days for medicals:** A pilot may request up to 2 pre-allocated X days per annum for aviation medical appointments
- **Flexible work arrangements** – flexi-line cap increase to 8%. Introduction of a 50% flexi-line MOMO (month on, month off) and application to carers lines in accordance with Fair Work Act (pg 6 of Company Doc)

Travel and Allowances

Transport

- **Public transport cap** increased to \$75 (via side letter).
- **Alt pax transport for patterns of one:** Provided to/from airport/hotel/sim centre if no additional cost to Company.
- **Boundaries:** Melbourne boundary corrected to FAM; Adelaide added (mirror SHEA).
- **Alt pax time determination:** Arrival time in layover port in UTC used to judge earlier/later flight.

Duty Travel

- **Class entitlements:**
 - If >6 First Class seats — confirmed P class only when pattern built.
 - Otherwise J confirmed upgradable to P (F0).
 - Where two aircraft within 6 h same city-pair, pattern to be built on aircraft fitted with First Class (if no impact to pattern/length).
- **Removal of 14-hour J-limit** and of cl. 31.5.2 (replaced with above pattern rule).
- **F0 upgrade priority:** Captain → FO → SO (>5 years); tech crew processed before cabin crew (via side letter, which has not yet been provided by Qantas and sits outside the EA coverage).
- **Deadhead limit:** 26.5 hours (max duty); removed requirement for P class > 24 hours.
- **Lie-flat seat requirement:** Sectors ≥ 6 hours must use lie-flat seat where available on same day same city-pair without credit increase; excludes domestic flying (except PER–AKL).
- **Foreign-carrier policy:** Confirmed J class on SQ, AA, EY, EK, LH, BA, QR, CX, AF, NH, LA; Other carriers by mutual agreement.
- **SO/SOT travel:** Duty travel provisions now apply to SOTs.
- **SO lounge access:** Highest category lounge on duty travel for SOs >5 years, TRI-SOs and TSOs.
- **Commuter tickets:** Removal of cap on four 25 % discount tickets (via side letter which has not yet been provided by Qantas and sits outside the EA coverage).
- **42Y FOC ticket:** Upgradable annually from 2026 (non-cumulative; side letter which has not yet been provided by Qantas and sits outside the EA coverage).

Fatigue and Credit Measures



- **Night Credits:** Extended to 787 four-crew operations; all crew complements aligned with A380.
- **MBTT increase:** International patterns with ≥ 6 night hours gain additional local night credit.
- **AFDP clarification:** Divisor +5 from standby call-out not applicable if standby awarded.
- **Reduction in rest when pax before >16-hr duty:** Applies only if pax ToD < 7 hours (e.g. BNE–PER); FRMS table aligned with FDTL (22 hr min rest).

Other Industrial Changes

- **Delegates' Rights Clause:** Inserted.
- **Dispute Resolution Clause:** updated (Company right to legal representation; aligned with SHEA).
- **Removal of Appendix F:** removed in its entirety.
- **Medical termination rehire:** Removal of AIPA veto.
- **Admin/Supervisory Pilots:** Representative test for flying mix; Priority 2C for open time if below $\frac{1}{3}$ line.
- **DSP:** Updated to match SHEA.
- **Bulk Vacancy Process:** Vacancies advertised by 30 April (min 14 days open).
- **LSL Allocation:** Leave year 1 Jan–31 Dec; may overlap year.
- **A330/A350 dual-type provisions:** Allows allocation of A330 and/or A350 flying; consultative trigger if A330 flying reduces. Future training to A350 in seniority order.
- **A330/A350 SFF type:** Removed (subject to rostering agreement in RM).
- **A320/1 recognised as Company type** for clauses 20 and 31.
- **Rostering protocol for AIPA reps:** MDC applicable to hotel inspections.
- **RCO letter:** side letter for nominal life of EA.
- **Implementation schedule:** to be annexed to EA.
- **Trainer reforms:** Significant trainer reforms.

Implementation and Timing

- **Implementation payment:** 15 credit hours per bid period (pro-rated) from commencement until first pay increase 13 July 2026 (17 hours for BP 12 July 2026). This payment will be a minimum of \$5000, meaning any pilot that will receive less than \$5000 based on the above credits will be 'topped up'.
- **Pay rises:** From first full pay period on or after 1 July 2026.



- **Implementation schedule:** to be finalised as EA annexure; target 8–12 weeks for operational transition.



Proposed Changes

Pay Structure

The single largest structural change in EA11 is the introduction of a new pay framework that departs significantly from the established EA10 model. The proposed structure alters both the rate composition and progression mechanics across fleets and seats, creating variations in outcomes depending on a pilot's position, seniority, and career trajectory. While the new framework simplifies some elements of pay presentation, it also embeds new relativities that redistribute earnings differently between fleets and ranks.

Importantly, the proposal seeks to align the Airbus fleets with the 787 pay structure. However, this alignment stops short of fleet pay: night credits are excluded from the A350 (which instead receives only an insignificant Long Range Credit (LRC)), and the established overtime (AFDP) provisions do not apply to the 787 and only minimally to the A350. These omissions create material differences in both pay and productivity metrics, despite hourly rate similarities.



Captains

0% 1-Jul-24				0% 1-Jul-25			3% 1-Jul-26			
CAPTAIN				CAPTAIN						
Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787		
0-3	\$353.97	\$337.13	\$321.07	1	\$391.43	\$391.43	\$368.03	\$391.43		
4	\$356.96	\$339.98	\$323.81	2	\$401.22	\$401.22	\$372.57	\$401.22		
5	\$359.75	\$342.61	\$326.28	3	\$411.26	\$411.26	\$381.88	\$411.26		
6	\$362.35	\$345.10	\$328.70	4	\$427.71		\$391.43	\$421.54		
7	\$365.28	\$347.87	\$331.24							
8	\$368.00	\$350.47	\$333.77							
9	\$370.35	\$352.72	\$335.93							
10	\$373.08	\$355.32	\$338.42							
11	\$375.50	\$357.61	\$340.54							
12	\$378.00	\$360.01	\$342.87							

0% 1-Jul-24	
CAPTAIN	
Year	B787
1	\$380.03
2	\$389.53
3	\$399.28
4	\$409.26

Figure 2

Figure 2: The table above compares current (EA10) Captain pay rates with those proposed to take effect from 1 July 2026 under EA11. The existing rates are displayed on the left, with the new pay tables on the right.

The colour coding illustrates the corresponding transition points for pilots who remain in their current fleet and seat, each colour band shows the equivalent pay level a pilot will move to under the proposed structure when remaining in category. This provides a visual guide to how existing pilots' rates map into the new system.

Pilots who remain in their current category will transition to the corresponding colour-coded pay level on commencement of the new agreement. Pilots who change fleet or rank (through promotion or type conversion) after EA11 takes effect will instead enter the new table at Year 1 of the applicable pay scale for their new category.

Captains progress through the incremental pay tables to the top tier: Year 4 for all fleets except the A350, which tops out at Year 3. Notably, the A380, A350, and B787 share identical hourly rates across Years 1 to 3, bringing the agreement a step closer to a fleet

pay model. From 1 July 2026, each subsequent year of the agreement applies a baseline 3% increase across all tables, as illustrated in Figure 3 below:

3% 1-Jul-27					3% 1-Jul-28					3% 1-Jul-29				
CAPTAIN					CAPTAIN					CAPTAIN				
Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787	Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787	Years on Type	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787
1	\$403.17	\$403.17	\$379.07	\$403.17	1	\$415.27	\$415.27	\$390.44	\$415.27	1	\$427.73	\$427.73	\$402.16	\$427.73
2	\$413.25	\$413.25	\$383.75	\$413.25	2	\$425.65	\$425.65	\$395.26	\$425.65	2	\$438.42	\$438.42	\$407.12	\$438.42
3	\$423.60	\$423.60	\$393.34	\$423.60	3	\$436.30	\$436.30	\$405.14	\$436.30	3	\$449.39	\$449.39	\$417.30	\$449.39
4	\$440.54	\$440.54	\$403.17	\$434.18	4	\$453.76	\$453.76	\$415.27	\$447.21	4	\$467.37	\$467.37	\$427.73	\$460.63

Figure 3

First Officers

0% 1-Jul-24				0% 1-Jul-25				3% 1-Jul-26				
FIRST OFFICER				FIRST OFFICER								
Years of service	A380	A330/A350	A330	Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787				
0-2	\$201.82	\$192.22	\$183.04	1	\$258.34	\$258.34	\$239.90	\$258.34				
3	\$209.94	\$199.95	\$190.32	2	\$264.80	\$264.80	\$245.90	\$264.80				
4	\$215.15	\$204.91	\$195.14	3	\$271.43	\$271.43	\$252.04	\$271.43				
5	\$223.72	\$213.04	\$202.93	4	\$282.28	\$282.28	\$258.34	\$278.21				
6	\$229.19	\$218.27	\$207.87									
7	\$234.15	\$223.00	\$212.39									
8	\$239.31	\$227.90	\$217.07									
9	\$241.65	\$230.14	\$219.13									
10	\$244.32	\$232.69	\$221.61									
11	\$246.64	\$234.89	\$223.75									
12	\$249.45	\$237.57	\$226.23									

0% 1-Jul-24	
FIRST OFFICER	
Year	B787
1	\$250.82
2	\$257.09
3	\$263.51
4	\$270.10

Figure 4

Figure 4: The table above illustrates the transition for First Officers (FOs) from current rates (shown on the left) to the proposed rates under EA11 (on the right). The colour bands indicate the pay level each FO will transition to if remaining in their current category.

For example, a Year 5 A330 First Officer will move from an hourly rate of \$202.93 to \$239.90 under the proposed EA11, representing an 18.21% increase from July 2026, with further increases applied over the life of the agreement. A Year 10 First Officer will transition from \$221.61 to \$239.90, an 8.26% increase from July 2026, also followed by subsequent increases during the EA term.

As with the Captains rates, 3% is added to the pay tables each year following introduction, and pilots progress through the increments in the pay tables. The following years are shown in figure 5 below:

3% 1-Jul-27					3% 1-Jul-28					3% 1-Jul-29				
FIRST OFFICER					FIRST OFFICER					FIRST OFFICER				
Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787	Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787	Year	A380	A330/A350	A330	B787
1	\$266.09	\$266.09	\$247.10	\$266.09	1	\$274.08	\$274.08	\$254.51	\$274.08	1	\$282.30	\$282.30	\$262.15	\$282.30
2	\$272.75	\$272.75	\$253.27	\$272.75	2	\$280.93	\$280.93	\$260.87	\$280.93	2	\$289.36	\$289.36	\$268.70	\$289.36
3	\$279.57	\$279.57	\$259.60	\$279.57	3	\$287.96	\$287.96	\$267.39	\$287.96	3	\$296.60	\$296.60	\$275.41	\$296.60
4	\$290.75		\$266.10	\$286.56	4	\$299.47		\$274.08	\$295.16	4	\$308.45		\$282.30	\$304.01

Figure 5

Second Officers

0% 1-Jul-24				0% 1-Jul-25				3% 1-Jul-26				
SECOND OFFICER (>Oct22)								Legacy S/O		B & C Scale S/O		
Years of service	A380	A330/A350	B787					Year	A380 <Oct22	A330/350 <Oct22	A380 & A330/350 >Oct22	B787
1	\$106.17	\$106.17	\$133.02					1	\$115.51	\$115.44	\$130.85	\$140.92
2	\$113.62	\$113.62	\$136.34					2	\$141.40	\$133.94	\$134.13	\$144.44
3	\$115.95	\$115.95	\$139.75					3	\$167.61	\$151.85	\$137.48	\$148.05
4	\$118.29	\$118.29	\$143.23					4	\$172.52	\$156.31	\$142.98	\$151.75
5	\$120.62	\$120.62						5	\$181.32	\$164.36		
6	\$122.95	\$122.95						6	\$186.28	\$168.83		
								7	\$190.90	\$173.05		
								8	\$200.24	\$181.53		
								9	\$202.85	\$183.76		
								10	\$205.70	\$186.50		
								11	\$208.44	\$188.95		
								12	\$211.20	\$191.43		

Figure 6



The table above shows the Second Officer (SO) pay tables. These are more complex than those of First Officers and Captains due to the split workforce created under EA9 and EA10. EA9 introduced Second Officer pay rates on the 787 that were based on a substantially lower percentage of a Captain’s rate. EA10 then extended this disparity by introducing a uniform C scale for new hires after a specific date. This has resulted in a significant pay gap between cohorts, which remains a highly contentious issue among pilots. More detail on the B and C scales is provided later in this document.

The proposed EA11 pay structure delivers substantially higher pay for new entrants in Year 1 of the new SO pay tables. For B- and C-scale pilots, the tables now top out at Year 4. Pilots can determine their transition point by referring to the corresponding colour-coded cells in the accompanying table. Legacy Second Officers remain the only group to retain a 12-year incremental table, which has been adjusted to incorporate the same Year 1 uplift applied to Captains. As shown in Figure 7, Legacy SOs with fewer than 11 years of service will move up two increments during 2027 and 2028 (one in January and one in July), reaching a ceiling at Year 12. The colour coding for these two increment changes can be confusing. A year 9 SO (yellow in July 2026) would move to the year 10 (red) band of the 2026 table in January 2027, then to the year 11 (yellow) band of the 2027 table in July 2027. Further examples can be explored through the AskAFAP app.

Legacy Second Officers with 12 or more years of service receive the lowest proportional uplift under the proposed EA. The Company’s justification for this is that these pilots already have access to promotional opportunities and higher-paying positions. In practice, this approach further splinters the Second Officer group, creating the greatest disparity in benefit distribution of any category.

SECOND OFFICER				
Year	A380 <Oct22	A330/350 <Oct22	A380 & A330/350	B787
1	\$118.97	\$118.90	\$ 134.78	\$ 145.14
2	\$145.64	\$137.95	\$ 138.15	\$ 148.77
3	\$172.64	\$156.40	\$ 141.60	\$ 152.49
4	\$177.69	\$161.00	\$ 147.27	\$ 156.31
5	\$186.76	\$169.29		
6	\$191.87	\$173.90		
7	\$196.63	\$178.24		
8	\$206.25	\$186.98		
9	\$208.93	\$189.27		
10	\$211.87	\$192.10		
11	\$214.69	\$194.62		
12	\$217.54	\$197.17		

SECOND OFFICER				
Year	A380 <Oct22	A330/350 <Oct22	A380 & A330/350	B787
1	\$122.54	\$122.47	\$ 138.82	\$ 149.50
2	\$150.01	\$142.09	\$ 142.29	\$ 153.23
3	\$177.82	\$161.10	\$ 145.85	\$ 157.07
4	\$183.02	\$165.83	\$ 151.68	\$ 161.00
5	\$192.36	\$174.37		
6	\$197.62	\$179.11		
7	\$202.53	\$183.59		
8	\$212.43	\$192.59		
9	\$215.20	\$194.95		
10	\$218.23	\$197.86		
11	\$221.14	\$200.45		
12	\$224.07	\$203.08		

SECOND OFFICER				
Year	A380 <Oct22	A330/350 <Oct22	A380 & A330/350	B787
1	\$126.22	\$126.14	\$ 142.98	\$ 153.98
2	\$154.51	\$146.36	\$ 146.56	\$ 157.83
3	\$183.15	\$165.93	\$ 150.23	\$ 161.78
4	\$188.51	\$170.80	\$ 156.24	\$ 165.83
5	\$198.13	\$179.60		
6	\$203.55	\$184.49		
7	\$208.61	\$189.10		
8	\$218.81	\$198.36		
9	\$221.66	\$200.80		
10	\$224.77	\$203.79		
11	\$227.77	\$206.47		
12	\$230.79	\$209.18		



787

The wage structure for the B787 remains unchanged under the proposed EA11, with the other fleets largely realigned to match its format. However, the increase in hourly rates on the 787 is lower than those applied to other fleets.

For 787 pilots, the uplift in total pay is primarily achieved through changes to the crediting methodology rather than through increases to the base hourly rate. The introduction of one-third night credits for both three-crew and four-crew operations, combined with an increase in the Minimum Guarantee Hours (MGH) and planning divisor to match the A380, results in higher credited hours for the same block hours flown. Based on the current 787 network, these changes equate to an effective 10.8% increase in total pay through enhanced crediting alone, in addition to smaller hourly rate increases.

It is important to note that the introduction of night credits was an AFAP claim put forward ***in addition to*** hourly rate increases. The Company, however, has treated the reintroduction of night credits as a purely financial mechanism, rather than recognising the safety and crew health basis upon which the AFAP advanced the claim. While night credits do alleviate some of the cumulative fatigue concerns associated with high divisors and extended duty periods (the equivalent stick hours at maximum divisor under the proposed EA 11 is lower than under an EA 10 rollover), they also carry trade-offs.

It is important to remember, that whilst this use of night credits and increase in MGH does represent a pay increase, when patterns are planned at MDC or a pilot has a large number of standby days, there will be an increase in days worked to achieve MGH.

In particular, because Division 3 superannuation and other benefits are linked to the hourly rate, rather than total credited pay, the structure may deliver a lower long-term superannuation outcome for certain pilots. Pilots should therefore weigh the short-term gain in total pay against the longer-term impact on their superannuation and benefits when assessing the value of this agreement.

Other Payments

A blank-line holder passive payment of 5 hours will be paid each blank-line in addition to all other pay. This amount will be 8 hours if a pilot successfully bids for a blank-line when not projected to be a BLH **based on the final projected lines. This means pilots cannot bid with confidence knowing which payment they will receive.** If 1 blank line was completed per year, this would represent approximately a 0.4% pay uplift.



An online training payment of 5.5 hours per year will be paid as a passive credit. Each separate training course will be valued at a minimum of one hour. If training exceeds 8 hours per annum, training will be paid hour for hour. Calculation of this online training pay will be based on the annual ‘weighted average’ of courses required to be completed by Long Haul pilots per annum, e.g. credit for a 2-hour course required to be completed every 2 years would equal one hour credit. For calculation purposes, the Qantas course timings to be used.

Analysis

To assess the financial impact of the proposed EA11 pay structure, it is first necessary to establish a baseline against which increases can be compared. The baseline used throughout this document is a 3% per annum increase from the expiry of EA10 with no concessions; effectively a “rollover” scenario. This assumption reflects what might reasonably be the result of an Intractable Bargaining Determination (IBD) outcome. The network IBD outcome supports this estimation, and material provided by Qantas also indicates that a 3% annual rollover is generally accepted as the benchmark.

It should be stressed however, that a rollover ‘offer’ is not on the table, and the IBD process is lengthy and uncertain. This will be covered in more detail later in the document.

This “rollover” scenario represents a status quo outcome, a continuation of existing pay tables and conditions, with annual increases of 3%. Any uplift above this baseline therefore constitutes the offset value for the concessions sought by the Company.

When comparing the proposed EA11 model against this baseline, the analysis shows that pay outcomes *can* differ across individual career trajectories. For some pilots, the total pay increase above the rollover baseline represents fair value, while for others the offsets do not provide the equivalent benefit. This is the result of the “snap-back” effect, which resets pilots to Year 1 on promotion or conversion to a new fleet or rank. The financial effect of this varies across fleets. On the A330 and A380, the Year 1 rate under EA11 is lower than the Year 12 rollover rate, resulting in a short-term pay reduction for pilots who move between these fleets. The impact is modest for the A330, where the Year 2 rate is approximately equivalent to the Year 12 rollover rate, but more pronounced for the A380, where it takes pilots until Year 3 to reach an equivalent rate. In contrast, the A350 Year 1 rate sits very close to the equivalent rollover Year 12 rate, meaning pilots transitioning to that fleet are largely neutral in immediate pay outcome.

The snap-back mechanism does not represent a new change for 787 pilots, as it simply aligns the other fleets with the increment structure already in place on the 787.

Under the proposal, pilots transitioning would ultimately reach higher hourly rates than those available under a rollover scenario, meaning that over time these higher rates would offset and eventually outweigh any initial cumulative losses caused by the snap-back effect.

However, pilots approaching retirement within that timeframe after taking promotion/conversion, or converting/promoting successively in minimum time on the A380 and A330 may not remain in category long enough to realise these benefits, meaning the value of the trade-offs may be less compelling for those particular individuals. Pilots should note that Qantas has indicated its intention to retire the A380 within the coming decade, which may influence career planning decisions and the long-term effect of snap-back on pilot careers.

When a pilot moves fleets or promotes under EA11, their pay resets to Year 1 of the new table.

How that affects earnings depends on which fleet they move to:

Fleet	Starting point (vs Year 12 rollover)	Time to reach yr 12 rollover equivalent	Key takeaway
A330	Slightly below	≈ Year 2	Small short-term dip, catches up quickly, year 3-4 higher than rollover
A380	Noticeably below	≈ Year 3	Larger short-term hit before recovery, year 4 higher than rollover
A350	Very close	≈ Neutral at Year 1	Essentially no pay loss (in year 1, relative to rollover) when promoting/converting. Year 2-3 higher than rollover
787	Unchanged	—	Already uses this increment model no new negative effect

Career trajectories remaining within the A350/787 fleets will be unaffected by these outcome disparities.

The disparity is most pronounced between pilots in similar positions separated only by timing on the A380, and to a lesser degree on the A330. For example, two pilots holding A380 command slots but commencing training one training year apart (potentially training a month apart) separated by the EA introduction, will experience an initial pay gap exceeding 5%, with the cumulative earnings difference covering 3 years.

Example career trajectories can be found in the appendix of this document.

There have been some significant changes to the RIN provisions from the agreed terms. As it currently stands, the following applies:

- If you are RINed to the B787 from any fleet, you will start at the highest pay increment.
- If you are RINed from the A380 to the A330 or A350, you will start at the highest pay increment.
- If you are RINed from any fleet to any fleet other than the 787 (except for those from the A380) you will be placed on year one pay. This is a crucial concession for any pilot that may be forced to change fleets as a result of a subsequent displacement in any RIN situation.

While the addition of the blank line payment and online training payment provide modest incremental benefits across fleets, they do not materially alter these broader disparities.

Importantly, however, the proposal generally offers strong long-term earnings potential. In some cases, particularly where pilots promote during the life of the EA to the A380, cumulative earnings at the end of the EA period may be lower than under a rollover, yet those pilots will ultimately reach a higher hourly rate that potentially delivers greater overall earnings over the remainder of their careers, depending on retirement date. Conversely, those approaching retirement and choosing movement between fleets or ranks may see a reduced benefit and should weigh that against the immediate trade-offs.

Ultimately, this analysis demonstrates that the proposed EA11 can deliver uneven value. Some pilots will see genuine financial improvement over a rollover scenario, while others may benefit less for the same concessions. Pilots must therefore assess the proposal in the context of their expected career trajectory, fleet preferences, promotion timing, and retirement horizon to determine whether the long-term trade-off aligns with their individual circumstances.

B- and C-Scale Second Officers

The AFAP's log of claims included a specific item to address the long-standing B- and C-scale pay disparity for Second Officers. The Company acknowledged early in negotiations that these scales were problematic, but stated that a return to full A-scale parity was not viable without reducing the overall pay uplift available to all pilots. From the Company's perspective, the introduction of the B- and C-scales under EA9 and EA10 had already been "paid for," and any reversal would require the pilot group to effectively "buy them back."

While the AFAP fundamentally opposes the existence of multiple pay scales and remains frustrated that these structures were ever put to a vote in EA 9 and 10, we must operate within the realities of the current bargaining position. With this in mind, the AFAP's approach was to aggressively close the gap between the scales while still delivering meaningful outcomes for all pilots. The proposed agreement, while not returning to legacy rates, delivers the largest percentage pay rises to C-scale Second Officers, followed by B-scale Second Officers, bringing these groups a step closer to parity.

Given that pilots typically spend less time as Second Officers than they do as First Officers or Captains, the AFAP determined that it would not be prudent to eliminate FO and Captain uplifts in order to fully align the B- and C-scale groups with legacy SOs. However, we did pursue additional measures to mitigate stagnation risk, specifically, incremental "stagnation mitigation" increases that would have applied in Years 7 and 8 of service for B- and C-scale pilots. The Company rejected these proposals outright.

B- and C-scale Second Officers should therefore assess this proposal in light of the material uplift it provides, while considering the alternative outcomes that may arise through escalation. Those escalation pathways and their implications are outlined in a later section of this document.

15-4 Contact Change

How it works

Under the proposed EA11, the 15–4 call requirement has been amended to introduce a limited form of passive contactability. The Company may now make a passive contact, meaning without calling or disturbing a pilot's rest period, between 15 hours and 9 hours prior to departure to advise of any service delay exceeding 15 minutes. This allows the

Company to communicate late-notice operational changes without breaching rest or duty-free periods.

After 9 hours prior to departure, pilots are no longer required to be contactable, preserving the integrity of pre-duty rest. However, pilots may still choose to accept changes voluntarily via WEBCIS if it is convenient to do so. The existing obligation for pilots to check WEBCIS or contact crewing between 15 and 4 hours prior to departure remains unchanged.

Analysis

From an industrial perspective, the 15–4 call change constitutes a concession to the Company. While it introduces limited flexibility in how operational updates are communicated, the practical impact for most pilots will be minor. Only in a limited number of cases, typically involving long-distance commuting, would this be considered a substantial concession. For most pilots, it represents a modest adjustment to contactability rather than a material change to rest or roster certainty. Nevertheless, during negotiations the AFAP regarded this as a notable concession and sought appropriate offsets in recognition of its potential operational and fatigue management implications. Pilots should consider their own circumstances and how this change may affect them when evaluating the overall agreement.

Duty Travel

First Class Duty Travel entitlement

Background

Qantas advised that reform to first class duty travel was a priority for the Company, primarily due to the economics of its new A350 high-yield first class cabin, which contains only six seats. The Company indicated that positioning crew on a given flight in these cabins would render the product unprofitable in these circumstances and create ongoing issues with displacement of full-fare first class passengers. Qantas made it clear that it would not be party to any agreement that did not include a concession on this matter. Consequently, any outcome that excluded such a concession would most likely arise only through a determined (IBD) outcome, which carries its own risks – including a likely standard rollover uplift that would particularly disadvantage B- and C-scale Second Officers.

Recognising this, the AFAP sought to minimise the impact of any first class duty travel concession by negotiating guardrail measures and maximising the value extracted in exchange for any change. It is important for pilots to note that this entitlement is not evenly distributed across the long haul pilot group. Based on company data, long haul pilots collectively operated an average of 0.65 first class duty travel sectors per pilot per year over the past twelve months. Therefore, when considering the value of the offsets secured in return, they should be viewed in proportion to that average usage.

Throughout negotiations, the AFAP strongly argued that any change should apply only to Project Sunrise (A350-1000) operations. The Company ultimately maintained that it was paying a fair price for broader application across long haul operations, reflecting both the high cost and limited availability of first class seats. Despite this position, the AFAP successfully negotiated significant guardrails to protect pilots and limit the practical impact of this reform.

The CEO has advised that no Qantas Group employee, including executives, will be eligible for confirmed First Class duty travel going forward. This policy will apply uniformly across the organisation and means Qantas will only be party to new enterprise agreements that remove this entitlement. While the Company cannot unilaterally withdraw an entitlement that remains covered by an existing EA, it has made clear that any future agreements that Qantas agrees to must align with this new policy position.

How It Works

Under the proposed EA11, the entitlement to occupy first class (P class) seats for duty travel has been substantially modified. For aircraft configured with six or fewer first class seats, the entitlement to confirmed first class travel no longer applies. These flights will now operate under a business class (J) confirmed.

For aircraft configured with more than six first class seats, a confirmed P class entitlement will continue to apply only at the time of pattern or pairing construction before roster promulgation, typically during the bid-line allocation process (week four of the week prior). Where a P class confirmed entitlement exists at pattern construction, it will be retained even if the pattern changes later (for example, due to X or Y patterning, crew change, or illness).

Post roster build, if a P class seat is available at the time a new pattern is created, a pilot will still be booked confirmed in P class, provided that no passenger displacement occurs and the booking is being made at least seven days before the commencement of the pattern. Otherwise, the duty travel will default to a confirmed J class booking.



All confirmed J class bookings will be upgradable to P class with an F0 upgrade category. Pilots will be upgraded in order of rank and ahead of cabin crew. **It should be remembered that this protection is provided by a side letter which has not yet been provided by Qantas and sits outside the EA coverage**

A further improvement secured through these negotiations is the introduction of a lie-flat clause, which sets a minimum seat standard for duty travel on sectors exceeding six hours. This clause ensures that pilots required to travel long distances for duty are provided with lie-flat seating, maintaining appropriate rest standards and alignment with fatigue management principles. It does not apply to domestic sectors and includes limited flexibilities that allow variation during operational disruptions, though the AFAP has expressed reservations about how these exceptions may be applied in practice. The clause closes a gap in the previous agreement that could have permitted long-distance positioning in recliner business-class seats, such as on the A321XLR, and therefore represents an important protection in the context of this concession.

Attached to these changes is the maximum dead-heading in business class limit of 14.5 hours. This change reflects the changes in first class duty travel entitlement.

Analysis

The change to first class duty travel represents a significant concession for pilots, both financially and symbolically. The entitlement has long been regarded as a core feature of long haul flying, and its reduction carries an emotive weight within the pilot group. From a practical perspective, the Company has made its position clear: maintaining confirmed first-class duty travel on high-yield aircraft, particularly the A350 with only six first class seats, is commercially unsustainable. Qantas has been equally clear that it would not agree to any enterprise agreement that did not include this reform.

While the loss of this entitlement is substantial, it is accompanied by some offsetting measures intended to compensate for the concession. The AFAP's focus throughout negotiations was to ensure those offsets reflected the value of what was being given up and to secure guardrails that placed clear operational and fatigue-related constraints on the change. One important element of this outcome is the introduction of a **lie-flat clause**, which the AFAP strongly advocated for. This clause closes a gap in the previous agreement that could have allowed long-distance positioning in recliner-style business class seats on the A321XLR. Its inclusion ensures that all long-haul duty travel will continue to meet an appropriate standard of rest and comfort, providing a defined limit to the scope of the concession.

The Company's position is that the only alternative to accepting this reform would be a determined (IBD) outcome, which carries uncertainty and potential risks, particularly for B- and C-scale Second Officers. Overall, the change marks a clear reduction in entitlement, and while the negotiated outcome preserves some protections, plugs a critical gap in rest standards, and is accompanied by a degree of financial compensation across the pilot group, its significance should not be understated. Pilots should weigh this loss against both the offsets provided and the risks associated with escalation to a determination when assessing fair value.

Simulator Call-Out Off Standby

How it works

Under the proposed agreement, pilots may now be called from a standby duty to support a simulator session. The minimum call-out notice is **five hours**, allowing additional preparation time for the duty: this is longer than the notice period that applies to flying callouts.

Only certain simulator duties are eligible for such callouts. Pilots **cannot** be called from standby for the following:

- Command test or check;
- Type rating test or check;
- ATPL test or check;
- Simulator Instructor Rating (SIR) test or check; or
- Flight Examiner Rating (FER) test or check.

This aims to limit callouts of simulator duties, but critically, the allowable call-out list still includes the cyclic EBT program.

Analysis

This change represents a **pilot concession** that will have varying effects across fleets and bases, both objectively and subjectively. The AFAP emphasised during discussions that the current simulator open-time allocation process is widely viewed as inconsistent, and often non-compliant. Many pilots who wish to access simulator support sessions before training are unable to secure them, while others are allocated simulator supports they did not seek.

To improve transparency and fairness, the AFAP proposed an alternative system that would include visibility of available sessions, early closing of allocations, a “willing to work” register, and SMS notifications for simulator availability. These initiatives were rejected by Qantas.

The inclusion of simulator callouts from standby may, in practice, provide some additional training support capacity for Qantas, but it also introduces a new demand on standby pilots. Its value will therefore depend heavily on individual experience, base practices, and personal preference. Pilots should consider the variable nature of this change when assessing the overall trade-off represented by the proposed agreement.

Category Changes

How It Works

The SFF category will be removed under the proposed agreement. Instead, there will now be separate types for the A350 and A330 fleets. Pilots will be able to hold dual qualifications on the A350 and A330, allowing cross-operation between the two types. Pilots holding this dual qualification will be paid the higher A350 pay rate when operating the A330, but will be subject to the work rules of the aircraft type being flown on a given sector. In practice, this means a pilot operating an A330 service from Brisbane to Los Angeles would receive A350 pay rates but be governed by A330 work rules. While this is a favourable outcome in that limited example, it is considered unlikely given the projected fleet utilisation and network forecast.

Training slot allocation will be determined by the ratio of aircraft within the combined fleet. For example, in an A330-dominant operation, A330-only training slots will initially make up the majority of vacancies. However, as the A350 fleet expands and A330 aircraft are retired, the balance will gradually shift in the opposite direction. Further detail on the mechanisms of this category change will be provided once drafting is complete. As the AFAP has been excluded from participation in the drafting process due to not endorsing the proposed agreement, we currently have no visibility of the developing implementation details.

Analysis

In practical terms, this category change does not materially alter the working arrangements or conditions of most pilots. The new structure closely resembles the existing SFF framework, and its operational impact is expected to be limited. The integration of PSN into a seniority-based framework introduces some complexity,

particularly when considered alongside the current “rotating within” arrangements that apply to A330 Captains.

During negotiations, the AFAP originally proposed that Qantas’ two long-term fleets (the A350 and the B787) operate under different systems, with the A350 on a seniority basis and the B787 under PSN. This proposal reflected the approximate split of pilot preference identified through the AFAP’s membership survey. The Company indicated it was largely agnostic regarding which system applied but noted that integrating the A350 and A330 under a seniority model would be administratively simpler. Qantas also advised that AIPA had expressed a strong preference to move toward an all-PSN mainline fleet, which ultimately influenced the Company’s approach to the final category structure.

Other Items

TAFB Changes

The Company has proposed removing the existing provision that allows pilots to claim accommodation and allowances for training when they reside more than 200 kilometres from the training location within the same state. The AFAP strongly opposed this change to Option 1 of the TAFB clause, particularly the removal of access to accommodation, as the Company’s justification was based on what it considered unreasonable use of Option 2.

Throughout negotiations, the AFAP highlighted that this change would disproportionately affect the most financially vulnerable group within the long-haul operation, B- and C-scale Second Officers, who also represent the highest proportion of commuting pilots. Removing this entitlement would increase their financial burden and make attending promotional or conversion training more difficult and costly.

The AFAP identified this as a red-line issue, one of a small number of items that would prevent the overall package from reaching an AFAP EA team in-principle agreement. Despite the issue being raised repeatedly as a threshold concern, the Company did not alter its position or engage meaningfully with the union’s feedback.

Fatigue and Rest

Through survey feedback, the AFAP identified fatigue concerns associated with short turnaround times following back-of-clock Asia–Australia flying, particularly for two- and three-crew operations. The AFAP raised this as a health and safety issue, and Qantas acknowledged the concern, agreeing to include an additional local night rest requirement where a duty involves six or more hours of night flying. The Company also proposed an



amendment to the existing rule requiring 48 hours' rest following a paxing sector and before an operating sector exceeding 16 hours. Under the proposed change, this rest period would reduce to 24 hours where the paxing sector is less than seven hours in duration. This amendment provides greater roster flexibility and, given the short paxing threshold, the AFAP has not identified any significant fatigue implications arising from the change.

Commuter Improvements

The proposal contains several modest changes intended to improve the commuting experience for pilots. While the AFAP held discussions with the Company about more substantial reforms to support commuters, many of these were dismissed early in negotiations. Qantas did, however, acknowledge the growing proportion of pilots who commute due to cost-of-living pressures. This shift reflects a generational change and Qantas will need to continue addressing the evolving needs of its commuter workforce in future agreements.

The changes included in this proposal are limited but practical. The home transport public transport cap will increase from \$55 to \$75, allowing pilots entitled to home transport to claim up to \$75 for travel within their domiciled port when no home transport boundary exists. The proposal also establishes an Adelaide home transport boundary and clarifies the existing Melbourne boundary. In addition, the current limit of four discounted confirmed-seat fares per year will be removed, enabling commuting pilots to access an unlimited number of discounted confirmed-seat fares.

Application of SH EA T&Cs

How It Works

When a pilot back-bids into Short Haul, whether in the same rank or by downgrading rank, they will transition to Short Haul terms and conditions after completing the agreed training pathway, excluding any Company-caused training delays. Following the agreed training pathway period, if a pilot has not yet checked out, pay will be calculated in accordance with clause 28.6 of the Short Haul EA, using the average of the actual divisors over the previous six bid periods for the awarded category.

Analysis

This concession stems from past instances where pilots back-bid into Short Haul at or approaching age 65 and subsequently remained on extended sick leave before retiring,



without ever commencing training. The Company is seeking to discourage this practice where the intention to operate in Short Haul may not be genuine.

The Company’s initial claim was that pilots over 65 who back-bid into Short Haul should immediately move to Short Haul EA conditions upon reaching 65. The AFAP rejected this outright because it would have unfairly impacted pilots who genuinely intend to continue flying in Short Haul later in their careers.

The revised proposal, now reflected in the current concession, targets the issue more proportionately and avoids penalising those transitioning in good faith. While it is technically a concession, its practical impact on the majority of pilots, including those planning to finish their careers in Short Haul, is minimal.

Short Line PP

How It Works

Short line pattern protection provides a safeguard for pilots whose rostered credit hours fall below the expected range in a bid period.

Under the proposal **standard window** is defined as:

Divisor – 5 hours to Divisor + 10 hours

Credit and pay outcomes are determined as follows:

Credit Outcome	Result
Credit hours are below MGH but within the standard window	No ATA applies and MGH is paid.
Credit hours are below MGH and below the standard window	ATA applies only up to the lower limit of the standard window, and MGH is paid.
Credit hours are above MGH but below the lower limit of the standard window	Fixed pattern protection applies to the lower limit of the standard window.

Key Definitions in EA10:

- **MGH (Minimum Guaranteed Hours):** 160 credited hours per 56-day bid period (787 = 145), subject to RM4.2.1 adjustments and exceptions for carers’ lines and flexi-lines.

- **ATA (Assignable Time Available):** a descriptor used in relation to a pilot and means the pilot can be assigned duties on a minute by minute offset basis and the pilot cannot reject offset offers. ATA pilots are PLH whose projected hours fall short of MGH. This ATA may be dropped unpaid if the pilots requests before the start of the BP.
- **Short / Low Line Holders:** Pilots allocated a line below the lower limit of the standard window, either through allocation (short PLH) or manual build (low PLH), until they achieve hours at or above that lower limit.

Analysis

This provision is a net positive for pilots. Short and low lines occur frequently across fleets and bid periods, and without protection, the Company can rely on ATA to fill gaps, shifting roster instability onto pilots. Under this clause, pilots retain pay protection to MGH even when flying is light, and exposure to ATA is limited and clearly defined. The arrangement maintains fairness in workload distribution while preventing pilots from being disadvantaged due to planned or unplanned short credit. In practice, this reduces volatility and provides steps towards increased stability.

Bid-Line Window

How It Works

The Company has proposed adjusting the standard bid-line window from the EA10 framework to a new range of:

Divisor – 5 hours to Divisor + 10 hours

In addition to this, an optional alternate window will be made available for pilots who prefer a tighter credit band for bidding purposes. This alternate window would be:

Divisor – 5 hours to Divisor + 5 hours

Pilots will be able to elect which window applies to their bid, enabling greater discretion over how their preferred line value is targeted during the bid process.

This change interacts with pattern construction, short-line identification, and open-time allocation, and has flow-on effects for how many pilots fall below the lower limit of the standard window (i.e., short/low PLHs).



Analysis

The introduction of the alternate (-5 to +5) window was pushed for by the AFAP. During consultation, it was clear that many pilots actively use the window limits as a bidding strategy tool, particularly those seeking to target specific roster structures, patterns, or X day alignment. Retaining this control was important to preserve flexibility for pilots to shape the rosters that work best for their personal and operational circumstances.

At the same time, the Company sought the wider (+10) upper window to improve planning flexibility, reduce the incidence of unintended short-lines, and relieve pressure on ATA usage and low-line construction. While broader windows do provide the Company with greater ability to stabilise line construction, the availability of the **optional** alternate window ensures pilots maintain meaningful control over their individual bidding outcomes.

The combined effect of these changes is likely to reduce the number of short and low line pilots over time, while preserving pilot choice in how line credit targets are set. For that reason, and given the protection built into the alternate window, the AFAP views this as a neutral claim, a change that provides operational flexibility without material detriment to pilot roster control.

Flexible Work Arrangements

How It Works

The provisions relating to flexi-lines have been amended in two key areas. First, the overall cap on flexi-line availability has been increased from four percent to eight percent of the total operational pilot establishment. This means the Company must approve a flexi-line application if the number of flexi-line holders sits below the cap. Second, a new “month-on/month-off” (MOMO) option has been introduced, allowing pilots to work one month on and one month off within each two-month bid period, at a 50% line value.

Flexi-lines continue to function as reduced-hour rosters that can be accessed for defined periods, with pro-rated pay, leave, and superannuation entitlements. They remain a mechanism for pilots seeking a more sustainable work rhythm, either for family, lifestyle, or fatigue-management reasons. The existing prioritisation for transition-to-retirement pilots continues to apply. Importantly, flexi-line pilots still participate in the blank-line rotation like all other line holders (excluding carers and supervisory pilots); their reduced hours do not exempt them from that shared coverage. The flexi-line value effectively defines their personal divisor, the baseline against which credit, pay, and MGH are calculated.



Analysis

The change to flexi-lines was initiated by the AFAP following strong member feedback. When divisors are high, many pilots report accumulating fatigue and burnout, yet access to flexi-lines has often been restricted due to the low four-percent cap. In the past, pilots have been denied flexi-lines despite meeting eligibility criteria simply because the quota had been reached. The AFAP claim sought to increase the cap to fifteen percent to reflect modern working practices and the growing need for genuine roster flexibility. The final eight-percent cap represents a compromise outcome that doubles the current availability.

The introduction of the MOMO (month-on/month-off) provision provides an additional flexible option particularly suited to flying parents or those seeking partial-time work arrangements. Given the likely tightening of carers-line eligibility under a statutory definition, the MOMO model offers a fair, structured alternative that still provides coverage for the operation while supporting pilots with family or wellbeing needs. Overall, the expanded flexi-line access and new MOMO framework represent a balanced improvement in flexibility, sustainability, and fatigue management across the long-haul operation.

Divisor +5 Change

How It Works

Under the current EA, when a pilot is assigned duties that take their projected credited hours above divisor + 5, the pilot is paid an additional hour of credit for each credited hour above divisor + 5 at the end of the bid period. This is intended to ensure that where the Company drives utilisation above the upper window, the pilot receives compensation for that additional productivity. The provision does not apply where the overrun is caused by downline disruption.

The proposed change narrows the entitlement. Where a pilot has bid for and been awarded a standby, and a subsequent call-out pushes their hours above divisor + 5, the additional payment will no longer apply. The payment continues to apply only when the Company assigns work that takes a pilot above divisor + 5.

Analysis

This change reduces the scope for pilots to use standby bidding strategically to maximise value when already approaching the upper end of the bid period credit range. The protection remains in full when the Company assigns the flying that causes the pilot to exceed divisor + 5, meaning the core intent of the clause, compensation for Company-driven over-utilisation, is preserved.

While this is technically a concession, the practical impact is minor, as the entitlement is retained where it matters most: when high utilisation is imposed rather than selected. The AFAP therefore considers this a small concession, but not a threshold or structural concern within the broader agreement.

Return Of Service / Freeze Changes

The proposal includes adjustments to return of service and freeze period provisions. Some of these changes formalise current practice, while others reduce freeze periods to reflect training efficiencies and operational alignment between fleets.

1. Formalisation of LWOP Return of Service Requirements:

The current EA does not explicitly outline return of service obligations following Leave Without Pay (LWOP). However, the existing practice has been:

- a. Return to the same category where possible, or
- b. A four-year freeze when returning into a higher category, and
- c. An 18-month freeze when returning into a lower category.

The proposal formalises this practice to provide clarity and remove ambiguity.

2. Freeze Period Between A330 and A350 Categories:

The freeze period between the A330 and A350 is proposed to be two training blocks. This reflects the reduced training footprint and greater commonality between the aircraft types, and is therefore more operationally realistic.

3. Reduced Freeze for Promotion on Type:

A reduced freeze period of two years is proposed for pilots promoting on type (for example, FO to Captain on the same fleet). This provides greater flexibility for pilots planning career progression and timing.

Overall, these changes provide clarification and practical flexibility that benefit both pilots and the Company. None were considered threshold issues.

Removal Of Appendix F

How It Works

Appendix F currently applies only to non-stop Sydney–Los Angeles–Sydney operations and provides additional protections specific to those patterns. The Appendix contains three key elements:

1. Duty Limitations:
Maximum scheduled flight deck duty of 9:30 and tour of duty of 17:00, extendable only at the pilot's discretion after duty commencement.
2. Crew Rest Facilities Standard:
Crew rest standards to be as mutually agreed between the parties.
3. Post-Pattern Day:
A requirement that pilots operating SYD–LAX–SYD in the same pattern must have an available day rostered the following day.

Under the proposal, Appendix F is removed entirely, meaning:

- Duty and tour-of-duty limits would default to general EA fatigue rules and FRMS provisions, rather than the fixed Appendix F limits.
- Crew rest facilities would continue to be governed by the existing EA rest facility standards, which already apply fleet-wide.
- The mandatory available day following same-pattern SYD–LAX–SYD would no longer be specifically guaranteed under this Appendix, which would move an X day from somewhere else in the roster.

It is important to note that this Appendix applies only to SYD–LAX–SYD and does not govern other ultra-long range or long-haul pairings.

Analysis

The AFAP initially resisted the entire removal of Appendix F, as the Company's early justification focused only on Item 3 (the post-pattern available day), while the proposal ultimately sought to remove the entire Appendix, including the specific duty limit protections, which are not replicated elsewhere in the EA.

Item 2 (rest facilities) is already covered by broader EA provisions, but Item 1 is not. Its removal therefore shifts fatigue protection for SYD–LAX–SYD patterns from explicit contractual limits to Company-managed FRMS controls.

The AFAP has long held concerns about the increasing reliance on Company-generated fatigue data to justify the erosion of prescriptive protections. While FRMS has value, it exists within a commercial organisation whose operational pressures do not always align with, and may at times conflict with, pilot fatigue mitigation. The ability of any commercial airline to be the sole regulator of its own fatigue boundaries is something the AFAP continues to scrutinise closely.

However, it must also be recognised that:

- The clause applies only to one specific route pair, and
- The removal does not trigger flow-on impacts to fatigue limits across other fleets or pairings.

On that basis, while the removal represents a concession, the AFAP did not consider it to be a threshold item that should prevent consideration of a broader EA outcome. The concern remains noted, and the AFAP reserves the right to continue monitoring the Company's application of FRMS and fatigue controls on ULR operations as part of ongoing safety oversight.

LSL Window

The AFAP sought improvements to the lead-in time for Long Service Leave (LSL) allocation. In recent years, staff travel has become increasingly unreliable, particularly for international travel during peak leisure periods. As a result, many pilots planning to take LSL have been required to purchase full-fare commercial tickets to ensure certainty for family travel, which significantly increases the financial planning component of taking LSL.

To make LSL genuinely usable and to allow pilots to organise and fund travel in advance, the AFAP argued that the notice period before LSL allocation needed to be extended. The Company accepted that this was a zero-cost change and did not require an offset or concession from pilots. Accordingly, the proposal now includes a longer lead-in allocation period, providing pilots with more certainty and adequate planning time when scheduling LSL.

Trainer Reforms

Below is a summation of Andrew Coull's letter.



The proposed EA11 introduces a comprehensive restructure of training roles, pay, and work rules across the Long Haul training cohort. The reforms aim to align all training categories under a single, standardised framework encompassing Type Rating Examiners (TRE), Type Rating Instructors (TRI-CA, TRI-FO, TRI-SO), and Training Second Officers (TSO).

Standardisation of Work Rules

All ground training pilots will operate under a consistent set of work rules. This change provides a unified basis for rostering, crediting, and fatigue protections across all instructor and examiner categories. For TSOs and TRIs, this means access to a structure and conditions previously applied only to TREs.

Introduction of the TRI-CA Role

To align with the Qantas Training and Checking Manual (TACM), a new Type Rating Instructor – Captain (TRI-CA) role will be created. This role carries similar duties to a TRE but does not require an examiner qualification. The TRE title will apply exclusively to pilots holding examiner approval.

Restructured Bid Lines

The standard Ground Training Block (GB) will increase from 24 to 28 days. It will comprise:

- 15 ground duty (S) days, each worth 7 credit hours, (increased from 12 S days + 1 A day);
- 3 reserve (R) days, each worth 10 credit hours when worked;
- 10 duty-free (X) days, (Increased from 8 X days).
- R days will revert to S days unless the minimum S days have been achieved.

A GB can be split once per bid period unless otherwise agreed. Bid line construction will consider training demand, timing preferences, and duty-free day requests.

Flying Blocks (FB) will consist of either 65 or 85 hours of flying, depending on the trainer's election, producing bid-line totals of 170 or 190 credit hours respectively. Each FB will include 13 X days. A trainer may elect to relinquish X days in order to facilitate personal flying patterns being awarded in the bidding process. The minimum X days will be 8 in a 28 day FB. Once additional X days are relinquished, they will not be able to be carried forward to the next FB. However, should pattern allocation permit, up to 11 X days will be allocated in the 28 day FB.

A Reduced Ground Bid Line (RGLB) option will be available once every seven bid periods. This provides:

- 9 S days, 3 R days, and 6 X days in the GB;
- Either 107 flying hours (for a 170-hour line) or 127 flying hours (for a 190-hour line).
- The RGLB is designed to give trainers a periodic increase in line flying while maintaining pay and conditions equivalent to a standard bid line.
- The RGLB will replace the existing trainer sabbatical Rotation To The Line 25.2.21 in its entirety in EA10.

170 HOUR REDUCED GROUND BID LINE		
9 S Days	107 Flying hours	3 R Days
63 Credit Hours	107 Credit Hours	30 Credit Hours
170 Credit Hours		200 Total Credit Hours
18 Days (6 X Days)	38 Days (17 X Days)	Included in 18 Day GB

190 HOUR REDUCED GROUND BID LINE		
9 S Days	127 Flying Hours	3 R Days
63 Credit Hours	127 Credit Hours	30 Credit Hours
190 Credit Hours		220 Total Credit Hours
18 Days (6 X Days)	38 Days (17 X Days)	Included in 18 Day GB



Flexibility and Rostering

At least 8% of pilots within each training category will have access to Flexi-lines, which allow work at 75% or 50% of standard bid-line values. Flexible work arrangements beyond these settings can be agreed individually.

Additional flexible arrangements between the pilot and the company are available appendix 1, lines 12-21.

Pilots will now have an entitlement to 23 X days per 56-day bid period. They may elect to reduce this number (to a minimum of 18) to facilitate additional flying. If X days are infringed by accepting additional duties, those duties attract 10 credit hours per day.

Simulator scheduling changes include:

- A maximum of two consecutive late-night simulator sessions unless otherwise agreed, followed by 24 hours off (to be confirmed in drafting).
- Minimum notice periods of one calendar day for most roster changes, and eight hours for recurrent, recency, or type-rating (non-test) sessions;
- Simulator duty duration capped at six hours for promotional or recurrent training (including briefing and debriefing) and eight hours for other sessions.

Classroom training is limited to eight hours per day with appropriate breaks. The amended clause does not define what classroom training encompasses, and specifically excludes breaks, therefore whilst 'classroom time' may not exceed 8 hours, the duty may.

Training Away From Base

Training conducted outside Australia will follow a localised-line model. X days taken away from base will be applied at the training location. Allocations will be made by award on a "longest since" basis, limited to ground training duties only.

Flying Allocation

Flying will continue to be assigned through the normal bid-line allocation process, with pre-allocation available when required for training or checking duties. Pre-allocation is voluntary and minimised where possible. A wider bidding window of ± 10 credit hours (up to the category's maximum divisor plus five hours) will apply to improve allocation outcomes.



Fixed-pattern protection will apply if a bid line is allocated below the chosen value (170 or 190 credit hours).

Personal Flying and Rotation

Personal flying entitlements will be standardised across all fleets to the lesser of 30 sectors or 30% of the bid-period divisor per six (or twelve) bid periods, depending on category. Pilots may voluntarily forgo personal flying to facilitate pre-allocated training.

The current policy for managing excess trainers and subsequent return to personal flying, RTL, will remain. The entitlement will be replaced by a company-approved rotation system. Future RTL awards will be managed on a “longest since” basis and subject to operational requirements. Pay percentages will continue to apply during rotations, but pay elements will not.

Personal Training and Meetings

Personal training and training meetings will be credited as passive hours. Where possible, these will be rostered within the flying block or at its commencement or end. Up to two flying-block days may be used to accommodate training meetings within the GB.

Leave and Pools

Separate annual and long-service leave pools will be created for trainers. Leave allocation will remain subject to training requirements, with proportional adjustments between GB and FB permitted to enable greater flexibility for ad-hoc leave requests.

Pay Structure and Elements

Trainer pay will continue to be based on 170 or 190 credit hours per 56-day bid period (MGH 170).

- Element 1A retained (Average Overtime)
- Element 1B retained (with the exception of non-787) if the trainer exceeds the line pilots average overtime. 787 trainers continue to be paid Element 1B even if they exceed line pilot average overtime.
- Element 2 will be removed.
- Element 5 will be revised to a fixed guaranteed amount less accrued allowances and incidentals (based on Cost Group 5 rates) and will continue to be taxed.
- Paxing credits remain passive.
- Ground training duties (classroom or simulator) will attract 7 credit hours when performed on an S day and 10 credit hours when on an R day.

- Simulator sessions exceeding 5 hours 30 minutes will attract additional passive pay for the excess time.

Pay Percentages and Qualifications

Pay percentages will now correspond directly with training qualifications, providing a consistent progression structure.

Category	Current	New
Second Officer	GND 4	GND 4, TRI 4, TRI-SIR 8, TRI-SIR + CPS 10
First Officer	GND 4, TRI 8	GND 4, TRI-SIR 8, TRI-SIR + CPS 10
Captain	Various	GND 4, TRI-SIR 8–11.5, TRE A 12, FER 12–13, TC 4–5, CAT 6–8

Additional percentage increments apply for specialist qualifications such as:

- Train the Trainer (TT): +0.5%
- Standards and Development (SD): +0.5%
- Flight Instructor Training/Test (FIR): +0.5%
- ATPL or EPC: +0.5%
- Multi-Qualified Trainer (MQT, dual-type training): +2.5%

Check & Training Captains and Training Captains:

Pay incremental on Hourly rate: 8% and 5%. Up from 6/7% and 4% (additional 0.5% for train the trainer) applicable divisor. (Not less than 170hours)

Personal flying still to be allocated in Normal bid line allocation window +/- 10hours. (With Pilot Company agreement increase divisor window to category maximum + 5hours).

Trainer may elect to forego personal flying allocation and be pre-allocated a full training line.

New reduced entitlement of lesser of 30% or 30 sectors personal flying per 6 bid periods.

All trainers can be pre-allocated training meeting.

Any return to the line can attract a Blank line as per longest since.



AFAP's Quick Reference overview of the proposed changes:

Legend:

	Major concession by the pilots (give) to the company.
	Minor concession or possibility of slight advantages or disadvantages, dependent on specific groups within the pilot body.
	Concession by the company - a win for pilots.
	Offset with varying outcomes dependent on career path.
	Neutral item with minimal effect, often clarifying grey errors within EA10.

Change	Explanation
Revised Pay Structure	Complex. Disparities between various categories and career trajectories. Large pay-rises for many. Punitive for fleet/promotion changes on A380 and to a lesser degree A330 due to "snap back effect" (relative to existing structure). Significant B and C scale increases.
Blank Lines (Carer's lines)	Carer's with a personal divisor greater than 80% are not automatically excluded to the allocation of a blank line (RM16.8.4) or standbys. This clause is vague and creates confusion, as EA11 does not clearly outline who qualifies for Carer's Lines or how carers can be excluded from blank lines. It does not sufficiently reduce the frequency of BLH rotation.
Training Away From Base allowance (TAFB)	Currently, if a pilot lives greater than 200kms but within the same state as their home base and they undertake training at their home base, they are eligible for flights, accommodation and allowances (Option 1) or they may elect for only

	<p>allowances to cover their own flights, accommodation and incidentals (Option 2a/2b).</p> <p>This concession will see the removal of the 200km boundary rule, meaning the above pilot will no longer qualify for any training away from base allowance. They will have to pay for their accommodation, transport and will not be provided with allowances.</p>
Sim support from Standby Callout	Ability to allocate sim support from standby callout with 5 hours notice. This will include EBT Cyclics/Renewals. (Not applicable for CM test/check, TR test/check, ATPL test/check, SIR test/check, FER test/check).
Duty Travel - foreign carriers	<p>Removal of first class requirement for foreign carriers. Pilots can be paxed in confirmed J class travel on the following foreign carriers - SQ, AA, EY, EK, LH, BA, QR, CX, AF, NH and LA. Lie flat seat requirement for sectors ≥ 6 hours. Otherwise booked in P-class on foreign carriers (where P class exists).</p> <p>Paxing on other airlines in business class (where P class exists) is subject to agreement between the Company and Association. The Company and Association can agree to amend the foreign carrier list.</p>
Duty Travel - maximum deadhead duty limit of 26.5 hours	Change the FDTL deadhead table limit of 26 hours to 26.5 hours. This also includes the removal of first class requirement for paxing > 24 hours.
SO lounge access < 5 years service	S/Os < 5 years of service do not have access to lounges on their own. They must be accompanied by eligible crew members.
Return of Service Limitation	Currently, a pilot must be able to supply the company with 2 years return of service when moving to a higher rated aircraft.



<p>Freeze Period on LWOP Return</p> <p>AFDP for Divisor +5 over projection from awarded standby</p>	<p>This now includes promotion also, not just to a higher rated aircraft.</p> <p>Entire 4 year freeze period when returning from LWOP into a higher category or 18 months if assigned to a lower category.</p> <p>Caution, QF has been unable to confirm if previous years on type/rank prior to LWOP count towards the 4 year freeze, or if it resets entirely upon return from LWOP. Until further clarification, this is viewed as a restriction on pilot's movement and therefore reduces QF's training costs beyond a typical 4 year freeze period.</p> <p>If you bid for a SBY and are awarded (not assigned) and you end up over projecting from a call out, you are not eligible for Divisor +5 AFDP. Assignment of SBY still attracts the payment.</p>
<p>Application of SH EBA T&Cs for backbid only</p>	<p>When using a back-bid from LH to SH (same or lower rank movement from LH to SH), after the agreed training path period, Pilot to be paid in accordance with cl. 28.6 of the SHEA based on average of the actual divisors over previous six bid periods of the category for which the pilot is training for.</p>
<p>SOT to FOT</p>	<p>Pilots can be employed as SOTs on day 1, then move to shorthaul and continue to be paid SOT wages during their SH training, despite the FOT pay function existing for direct hires.</p>
<p>Classroom List</p>	<p>Removal of prescriptive requirements in RM22.4.2. A limit of 8 hours per day will remain, with reasonable breaks. Specifics around 'classroom' and 'chalk and talk' limits removed.</p> <p>The drafted clause excludes breaks and does not define 'classroom' training. This means Qantas could exclude breaks, equipment training, doors and any practical training from the 8 hour limit. In theory Qantas could roster pilots for training days</p>

Bulk Vacancy Process	<p>well in excess of 8 hours with no other limit. Qantas has not addressed these concerns.</p> <p>To give the company flexibility when BPs fall outside of vacancy allocation dates, the Bidding timeline for advertising vacancies is to be changed from 'by 15 April' to 'by 30 April'.</p>
Change Pattern Limited PP to Calendar Day PP	<p>Replace Pattern Limited PP with Calendar Day PP. Gives the company more flexibility to crew flights within the same calendar day.</p>
Removal of AIPA veto for medical termination	<p>Removal of AIPA veto on decision not to rehire after medical termination.</p>
Requirement to accept revised report time within 15/9 window of 15/4 call.	<p>15-4 call remains. Between 15 and 9 hours prior to departure, a passive contact (sms and email) can be made for delays greater than 15mins. Within 9 hours prior to departure the sign on time is fixed and you are no longer contactable.</p> <p>Any delays are to be notified by passive contact incl. post 9 hours. Pilot may elect to accept delay post 9 hours as current practice if they wish.</p> <p>Pilot must make positive contact via Webcis acceptance or phone call.</p> <p>The sign on time cannot be rolled after it has been accepted and you are inside the 9 hour window, unless you make yourself contactable.</p> <p>Concerns remain as the company has yet to define if the 9 hour passive contact window is anchored to the original departure</p>



<p>RIN Provisions</p>	<p>time, i.e. not allow it to be a continual rolling contact time with every updated departure time.</p> <p>32.5.6 remains for pilots RIN'ed to the 787 and starting at the highest pay scale.</p> <p>Introduction of A380 pilots RIN'ed to a lower category start at the highest pay scale.</p> <p>There are no protections for pilots who are subsequently RIN'ed to the A330 or the A350 in their current rank, or any pilots RIN'ed to any fleet other than the 787 in a lower rank.</p>
<p>Duty Travel - J confirmed upgradeable to P (for all paxing after BP roster build)</p>	<p>Post roster build, if a P class (First Class) seat is available at the time of pattern creation, a pilot will be booked in P class (confirmed) subject to there being no pax displacement and subject to being equal to or greater than 7 days from commencement of the pattern.</p> <p>Otherwise - Duty travel - J confirmed upgradeable to P class (F0) for aircraft configured 6 P class seats or less (Sunrise A350).</p> <p>P-Class Entitlement for an aircraft with more than six P class seats only at pattern/pairing construction (i.e. when patterns are made available for bidding). This is typically week-four of the week prior, in the bid-line allocation process.</p> <p>Where P class confirmed entitlement existed at pattern/pairing construction, this will be maintained if pattern subsequently changed (eg X or Y pattern or crew change/illness etc).</p>

	<p>F0 order to prioritise in the same order as leisure travel priority eg. CPT-->FO-->SO (via letter confirming agreed change to duty travel policy). Tech crew are processed prior to cabin crew for upgrade priority.</p> <p>Caution, this is only facilitated via a side letter and therefore will not be included in the EA. There are no protections to stop QF from assigning priorities to any other workgroup that may have a higher upgrade category in the future, for e.g. an F-1.</p>
<p>Duty Travel - removal of 14hr J class limit</p>	<p>Can now pax longer than 14hrs in J class due to removal of certain first class entitlements.</p>
<p>Reduction in min. rest when pax prior to >16 hour duty period</p>	<p>Reduction in rest only applicable if paxing ToD <7hours (intent to capture BNE-PER). Align the 4 Pilot FDTL table to FRMS table (following pax up to 7 hours - 22 hours min rest preceding a duty>16hr) eg. PER/AKL prior to LHR/JFK. Practically aligning with pilot preference for short paxing duties.</p>
<p>Duty Travel - upgrade priority of F0 (CPT, FO, SO>5yrs)</p>	<p>F0 order to prioritise in the same order as leisure travel priority eg. CPT-->FO-->SO (via letter confirming agreed change to duty travel policy). Tech crew are processed prior to cabin crew for upgrade priority.</p> <p>Caution, this is only facilitated via a side letter and therefore will not be included in the EA. There are no protections to stop QF from assigning priorities to any other workgroup that may have a higher upgrade category in the future, for e.g. an F-1.</p>
<p>Duty Travel - lie flat J seat entitlement</p>	<p>Sector length >=6 hours. Where aircraft configured with lie flat seat is available on same day, same city pair and credit hours for pattern are not increased, lie flat seat is required. Apart from in the case of operational disruptions - with clause to be defined in drafting including what constitutes an operational</p>



Commuter	<p>disruption. Lie flat seat entitlement excluded for domestic flying as defined in the LHEA (not including PER-AKL, AKL-PER).</p> <p>"Operational disruptions" have not been defined, therefore caution must be taken when considering this as a positive addition.</p> <p>Removal of cap for x4 25% discount tickets - Caution, via a side letter (staff travel policy variation), not included in this EA. This letter has still not been provided from Qantas.</p>
Alt pax Transport for patterns of one	<p>Transport provided to/from airport/hotel/sim centre if alt pax and on a pattern of one (no additional transport cost). Can use cab charge.</p> <p>Caution, QF have been unable to confirm if crew become a "pattern of one" when only one crew member remains due to other crew forgoing their entitlements or alt paxing earlier.</p>
SO Seniority	<p>Clause 16.6.2 to also include Second Officer under Training (SOT) in 18 month freeze for movement of type. Currently the wording of the freeze period applies to SOs, and doesn't specify SOTs. The intent is to apply the freeze also to SOTs (SOs still completing their endorsement).</p> <p>16.6.2 b) has discretion to allocate the pilot to any aircraft type. The company has not responded to clarification requests to outline if a SOT can be assigned to SH prior being checked to line. This must be seen as a risk that pilots could be assigned to the 737 or 321 at any point prior to CTL.</p>
A330/A350 SFF - aircraft type only	<p>Removal of A330/A350 SFF as an aircraft type. Will return to A330 and A350. Subject to agreement on rostering arrangements to be included in RM.</p>

<p>Blank Lines</p>	<p>Passive payment of 8 hours if a pilot bids and is awarded a BL (when they were not projected for one). Passive payment of 5 hours if a pilot is assigned a BL.</p> <p>This brings a financial penalty in for the company if they do not have the correct establishment numbers for each specific rank, type, base etc.</p> <p>The BLH payment will be based on the projected lines after the final run, not preliminary. This means that pilots must bid for Blank Lines before knowing what they will be paid. This removes any ability to make an informed decision, as a pilot must bid for a blank line before the final projected lines are released. This will require pilots to chase this entitlement up after the fact.</p>
<p>Localised Lines for Trainees</p>	<p>This clause was introduced during drafting of the document and did not form part of the in principle agreement. Currently there are no proper provisions for offshore training. This opens the door for dispute under the current EA regarding how the Company schedule and pay for offshore training. The changes introduced in the drafting document formalise the current practice.</p> <p>The inclusion of trainee localised lines represents a relatively minor drafting addition, and concession, that did not form part of the in principle agreement.</p>
<p>Paired Flying</p>	<p>Paired flying with Training Captain can now take place for all promotional training outside of official training pathway. Removal of transitional training pay for FO and SO.</p>

<p>Short Line PP</p>	<p>No ATA within bidding window even below MGH</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Personal divisor = allocated hours except when they are below MGH & below the bottom of the standard window * Min Personal divisor from roster build = MGH minus 5 (155) * Allocated hours between personal divisor and bottom of standard window are fixed * RM6 to be amended as required or removed * Max divisor plus 5 as upper limit * Non std window of +5 to -5 available * Minimum credit hours is MGH even if personal divisor is below MGH. * Any ATA below the standard window and below MGH remain
<p>PP applicable when stick limit(s) exceeded</p>	<p>Clarification of current practice: When a pilot's stick hours are exceeded, the Pattern Protection is offsetable. This is currently not spelt out in RM40.3.1, and as such is viewed as an increase in contactability.</p>
<p>Night Credits and divisors on B787 (implications)</p>	<p>Implications for DIV 3 super: Pay increases on 787 mainly achieved through increased credit hours for a given amount of stick hours moving closer to fleet pay. Impact on div 3 super relative to a rollover EA is a consideration for those pilots.</p> <p>Minimum Daily Credit (MDC) trips and standbys unaffected by credit hour increase (still remain at 5:30). 787 will be aligned with legacy fleets on divisors. Given there is an increase in planning divisor, there would need be an increase in the amount of SBYs and MDC trips for pilots to achieve planning divisor.</p>

	<p>Bulk of pay increase delivered upfront for 787 pilots. Other fleets have pay increases delivered over multiple years.</p>
Night Credits and divisors on B787	<p>For 4 crew ops, for each flight hour of the agreed sector times scheduled between 2000 (LST) and 0800 (LST) at the initial point of departure of each flight duty period, a pilot of an operating crew will, in addition, receive a credit of one third of an hour pro-rated for time less than one (1) hour.</p> <p>For 3 crew ops, night credits will change from one quarter to one third additional credits.</p> <p>MGH increases from 145 - 160. Planning divisor increases from 155 - 173. This is to facilitate night credit introduction for 4 crew ops on the B787 and change to existing night credits for 3 crew ops. Designed to protect from fatiguing duties encompassing back of the clock operations.</p>
Public Transport increase	<p>When outside a port with a home transport boundary, the approved public transport allowance has increased from \$55 to \$75.</p>
Bid Line Construction - Wider Std Window	<p>Increased Standard Window (-5 to +10). Floor of 155, ceiling = max divisor +5. Personal Divisor applicable to all pilots (as above). Alternative window option (-5 to +5).</p>
Freeze period for promotion on type	<p>If promoting on type, the freeze period is now 2 years, reduced from 4 years as it is in LH EA10.</p>
Online Training	<p>Passive payment 5.5 hours each FY for online training. Online training up to 8 hours per year based on SHEA weighted average calculation. Pro-rated payment upon commencement of EA (period of commencement through to 30 June 2026). Then paid in first full pay period after 1 July each year.</p>



LSL Allocation	LSL year 01 Jan - 31 Dec. Current bidding timeline remains. Leave may overlap the period i.e. not required to be contained to calendar year.
A330<-->A350 Two training block freeze period	Reduction from 4 training years to 2 training years.
X Days before Sim	X Day immediately preceding a recurrent simulator on return from AL/LSL, unless otherwise agreed (i.e. pilot requests not to be allocated X day).
2 x HL Days pre-allocated for Medicals	Aviation medical appointments - pre-allocated Holding Leave day(s). Notification week 1 of BP prior. Up to '2 days'. Pilot may elect to infringe MBTT through Carmen bidding (tick the box).
Increased MBTT/MPG	MBTT -> for international patterns that currently attract 1 local night, increase to 2 local nights if night hours are greater than or equal to 6 hours (i.e. 3 day international patterns). No change to MPG.
Flexi line cap increase	Increased to flexi line minimum from 4% to 8%. Add ability for 50% flexi line to be taken as 'MOMO' (4 weeks on, 4 weeks off).
SO lounge access	Highest category of lounge while on duty travel for S/Os >5 years of service, TRI-SOs and TSOs. S/Os < 5 years of service may be accompanied by any eligible tech crew, but cannot enter on their own.
42Y FOC ticket upgradable	Annual 42Y FOC ticket upgradable from calendar year 2026, non-cumulative. Caution, this is only facilitated via side letter and therefore will not be included in the EA.

Implementation payment	15 credit hours allowance per bp paid (pro rated) from the first full pay period after commencement of EA until first pay increase on 13 July 2026 (the allowance for the BP finishing on the 12 July 2026 will be 17 hours). Pay rises as per pay tables on or after 1 July 2026 for nominal life of EA.
Base Transfers	Temporary One Way Base Transfers. 2 BP limit. Award only. Based on datal seniority (similar to SHEA).
Offsetable PP for Travel docs	Offsetable PP applicable if passport/visa is awaiting approval (submitted and no fault of pilot). Currently there is no pattern protection for not having required documents valid.
Duty Travel - removal of cl. 31.5.2 and replaced with pattern built on an aircraft fitted with first class	When 2 aircraft departing within 6h on same city pair direct service, the pattern will be built on an aircraft fitted with first class as long as no impact to trip length, pattern or pax displacement (exc. A350 aircraft).
A350 and A330	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Insertion of clauses in RM to enable A330/A350 pilots (that are qualified on both A330 and A350) to be allocated A330 flying. 2. PSN for A330/A350 allocation. 3. Wording to clarify that a A330/A350 pilot may be qualified on A330 and/or A350 and allocated A330 and/or A350 flying. 4. A consultative clause to be inserted when A330 flying available to A330/A350 pilots is projected to reduce to a level that will require pilots to only operate the A350. 5. A330/A350 pilots who are only qualified on the A330 (and new pilots joining the category) will be trained to the A350 in seniority order subject to bases and operational requirements.
Admin Supervisory Pilots	Priority 2C for Open Time where pilot has dropped flying below 1/3 of a line or flying not allocated.



Admin Supervisory Pilots (representative test)	Representative test for admin SVY pilots (allocation of flying is representative of total flying mix) - representative of pilots category not pool. Once the representative flying is taken out it can be distributed to admin supervisories at QAL discretion.
Removal of Appendix F	Refers to SYD-LAX-SYD direct flights. Currently, a pilot should have an A day scheduled immediately after this pattern rather than an RX day. It also outlines maximum scheduled flight deck duty time and tour of duty time. These times are covered in the FRMS now.
Alt pax	For the purposes of alternate pax arrangements, UTC arrival time in layover port will be used to determine if a flight is later or earlier than the original planned flight.
Transport boundaries	Correct the EBA Melbourne boundary (in line with the FAM) and add Adelaide boundary - mirror SHEA.
A320/1	Inserted as a Company Aircraft type for cl. 20 and cl.31.
Delegates Rights' Clause	As per SH EA.
DSP	Updated Disp. Res. Clause (Including QF right to legal representation) - aligned with SHEA.
SO duty travel to incl. SOTs	Update Duty Travel to inc. SOTs (same as Second Officers <5 years).
Rostering protocol for AIPA reps	MDC applicable to hotel inspections.

Overall Summary

Pilots are encouraged to approach the proposed EA11 package with calm, clear-headed analysis rather than emotion. It is natural for feelings of frustration, fatigue, or uncertainty to surface during long and complex bargaining processes. However, meaningful decisions on an enterprise agreement must be made on the basis of knowledge, evidence, and understanding, not on anger, fear, or anecdotal impressions.

This proposal should be viewed through a practical and strategic lens, assessing not only its immediate outcomes but also the broader industrial and operational landscape. Pilots should take the time to understand the escalation pathways available, the risks involved, and the degree of leverage that realistically exists to extract additional value through further dispute or determination processes. The choice before pilots is not between ideal and unacceptable, but between a negotiated package, with known benefits and concessions, and alternative pathways that would depend on external determination and carry a degree of uncertainty.

Members are strongly encouraged to engage in a deliberate decision-making process using the G.R.A.D.E. model, Gather, Review, Analyse, Decide, and Evaluate. This means reviewing factual data, asking questions about the mechanisms and implications of specific provisions, and avoiding reliance on informal commentary or speculation. The proposal can produce variable outcomes across fleets, ranks, and individual career timelines, but it does not fundamentally alter the way we work to the same degree that EA9 and EA10 did.

The AFAP has recommended that pilots vote no for EA11. As detailed in this document, there are varying outcomes for different groups of pilots, however the AFAP has made the determination that the concessions detailed in the document do not represent value for members in the long term. However we also support all pilots to vote with wisdom, education, and clarity, grounded in a full understanding of both the proposal and the broader context in which it has been reached.

Next Steps

The AFAP continues to plan and prepare for all possible outcomes over the coming weeks. We draw on both specialist internal expertise and external legal advice to ensure our strategy is informed, effective, and in the best interests of our pilot members.

In the event of a yes vote, we will respect the outcome of the vote and support its approval, as we see no compliance issues with the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth).

The QPC Committee has recommended a no vote having considered the final agreement in the present circumstances. However, AFAP advice remains for pilots to assess the deal as a whole, considering the positive and negatives, and review all available information including the options outlined below, before making a decision how to vote.

What happens if there is a no vote?

Should pilots reject the offer, the AFAP will resume bargaining as soon as possible, and, depending on the circumstances, we may conduct a further survey to gather information on what pilots would want in an improved offer.

We will then present solutions to Qantas that address pilots' concerns. A negotiated agreement, endorsed by the AFAP, will always remain our goal.

If a negotiated resolution cannot be achieved, the AFAP will be willing to utilise any of our rights available under the Fair Work Act to advance the interests of our members. We discuss these options further below:

Bargaining Dispute – FWC assistance with bargaining

Under s.240 of the Act, the AFAP may make an application to the Fair Work Commission (FWC) to deal with a dispute between bargaining representatives about an agreement.

This is an option to utilise the assistance of a Commission member to advance negotiations, in circumstances where negotiations in the room have reached a stalemate.

Under this part of the Act the FWC can:

- mediate or conciliate the dispute; and
- make a recommendation or expressing an opinion.

This process is aimed at using the influence of the FWC to facilitate a negotiated outcome. This may include directing a party to provide more information or recommendations on whether a party should accept an outcome.

These powers however are limited in that they are not binding. The FWC may only arbitrate the dispute if all of the bargaining representatives for the proposed agreement agree.

An application under s.240 of the Act is also a pre-requisite for an application for an intractable bargaining declaration (see below).

Protected Industrial Action

A further option to escalate in the event of a negotiated outcome not being reached is protected industrial action (PIA). PIA allows pilots to engage in strikes or other industrial action without risk of repercussions, such as fines or termination of employment.

The AFAP have extensive experience in utilising PIA effectively across the industry. However, this option is always a last resort. It is only considered once all other avenues to achieve a negotiated outcome have been exhausted. Even then, several procedural steps must occur before any action can commence.

Protected Action Ballot Order (PABO)

The first step in pursuing PIA is an application by the AFAP (or other bargaining representative) apply for a Protected Action Ballot Order (PABO).

We must demonstrate to the FWC we are "genuinely trying to reach agreement", which is something that the AFAP ensure we comply with throughout bargaining to always preserve our options under the Act. This requires that we give serious consideration to all claims from Qantas. This does not require we make concessions or agree with these claims.

If the FWC approves a PABO, an independent ballot agent conducts a confidential ballot of AFAP members (or other Union applicants).

This ballot will include types of PIA specified by the AFAP (generally a range of options from minor bans through to strikes of varying duration) and members vote to approve each of these actions individually. In all, 50% of the members eligible to vote must participate, and of those at least 50% must approve each action for it to then be available as PIA.

The ballot declaration will not disclose the identity of Union members or how they voted. However it does provide the total number of AFAP members, and the total votes for each type of PIA. Therefore, maximising membership numbers and participation in the PABO is

critical to demonstrate to Qantas the unity and resolve of the pilots and strengthens our collective bargaining position.

Pilots can join the AFAP at any time and participate in PIA with all the protections of the Act, even if they don't vote in the ballot.

Notification of PIA

The AFAP must then give 3 clear working days' notice of PIA, before it can commence. The notice must specify the type of action and the date and time when it commences. Any member of the AFAP eligible to be covered by the LHEA can then participate in the action and be protected.

Payment for PIA

Employees are not permitted to be paid for any time they are participating in strikes even when they are PIA. This does not apply in the case of a "partial work ban", which is any PIA which is not a complete stoppage of work. For example, this might be a ban on pilots accepting a simulator support duty assigned from reserve but otherwise performing their reserve duty as normal.

In the case of a partial work ban, the Employer has the following options:

- accept the partial performance of duties and pay employees as normal; or
- accept the partial performance of duties and deduct a partial payment from employees wages commensurate with the duties not performed (this calculation can be disputed); or
- refuse to accept partial payment of duties and not pay employees at all for the duration of the ban.

This last option allows an Employer to escalate action by effectively withholding pay unless the employee agrees to perform their full duties or the ban is withdrawn. If an Employer takes this step, employees may respond by going on strike without notice.

Employer Response Action

An Employer also has the option of taking response action, if PIA is taken by employees. The Act permits an employer to engage in a "lockout", which is more flexible than the wording suggests as it does not require that all employees are locked out of the workplace.

Once an Employer takes industrial action, employees can then give notice of "employee response action". This action can be any form of PIA and does not need to have been authorised by a PABO.



Other responses

Other options are available to Qantas, such as making an application to terminate the PIA – a tactic familiar to LH pilots from previous negotiations. These are complex areas of law, and should we reach that stage, the AFAP will provide detailed legal guidance to ensure members are fully informed and protected.

Intractable Bargaining

Intractable bargaining declaration (IBD)

A bargaining representative can apply for an intractable bargaining declaration (IBD) when negotiations reached an impasse and:

- have been bargaining for at least 9 months (the minimum bargaining period); and
- the agreement has been expired for at least 9 months; and
- have already tried to resolve the bargaining dispute including by making an application under section 240 (see above).

In addition there are a number of other factors which must be considered by the FWC in determining whether a negotiation is "intractable". Even though this negotiation meets eligibility for an application for an IBD, it does not guarantee that the FWC determine based on current circumstances that bargaining is "intractable".

Workplace Determination

If the FWC makes an intractable bargaining declaration, and bargaining representatives do not agree on the settlement of the new agreement during a post declaration negotiation period, the FWC must make an intractable bargaining workplace determination (IBWD).

In that event, the FWC will set the terms and conditions of employment in place of the current enterprise agreement and pilots will not get a vote on the outcome. The AFAP and other bargaining representatives will present detailed submissions and evidence to advocate for terms that best serve our members' interests. But ultimately it is out of the hands of the pilots and the final decision rests with a Full Bench of the FWC.

Agreed Terms

An IBWD can only be made concerning items which are not "agreed terms". Agreed terms are terms that the bargaining representatives have already agreed should be included.

They can be terms that were agreed:

- at the time the application for an intractable bargaining declaration was made; or
- at the time the intractable bargaining declaration was made; or

- at the end of the post-declaration negotiating period.

We are conscious that the in principle agreement of the AFAP as a bargaining representative may “lock in” a term if we reach an IBWD. However, this will not preclude us utilising the leverage of our endorsement to reach in principle agreement. This is because as the pilots representatives we must be capable of reaching agreement in the room to ensure our effectiveness in bargaining. However, as always it will be ultimately up to pilots to approve in a vote.

Pilots should not be concerned that agreed terms are locked in based on the current offer. Previous FWC decisions found parties can withdraw their previous endorsement for agreed items or make an agreement subject to agreement on the whole package (i.e. nothings agreed until everything’s agreed). This means in the event of a no vote, any bargaining representative that has previously reached in principle agreement may revisit or “unagree” terms.

Terms must be more favourable

Under s270A of the Act, any terms of a IBWD "must be not less favourable to each of those employees, and any employee organisation that was a bargaining representative of any of those employees, than a term of the enterprise agreement that deals with the matter." The consequence of this provision is it limits the scope of the changes that are not agreed by the Unions that Qantas can seek through IBWD.

Will the AFAP make application for IB after a no vote?

The AFAP was the majority union representing pilots through the Network IBWD. The AFAP engaged external lawyers and have received extensive advice regarding IBWD.

While all parties will seek to put a "spin" on the Network outcome, the decision serves as little precedent value for any other IBWD. This is because each negotiation will have unique facts and circumstances and will largely stand alone.

At this stage, even in the event of a no vote, the AFAP does not believe the threshold for an IBD has been met, given our commitment to achieving a negotiated outcome. Additionally, before any IBD application could even be made, an application under s.240 would first be required.

In the Network case, multiple agreements were voted on and rejected and protected industrial action had occurred before the FWC determined the dispute was intractable.



Our firm position remains that negotiated outcomes are always preferable to allowing a third party to impose terms, a process that is uncertain, complex, and slow.

For context, the Network Aviation IBWD took approximately 18 months from the initial IBD application to the final determination.

While Qantas would be limited in what it could achieve through such a process, the AFAP also recognises that pursuing major structural changes (for example, to SO pay scales or key conditions) through an IBWD would also present challenges.

Summary

The AFAP remains committed to achieving the best possible outcome for pilots through constructive negotiation.

However, we will always be prepared to use every available tool under the Fair Work Act, including FWC processes, intractable bargaining provisions, and protected industrial action, if required to protect and advance your interests.

We share this information so that all members can make an informed and balanced decision when considering how to vote, understanding both the potential risks and the pathways available to improve the overall package in the event of a no vote as recommended by the QPC Committee.



Appendix

Appendix A – Example Career Trajectories

Career Trajectory Examples — How to Read the Tables

The following examples compare total base pay outcomes under the proposed EA11 and a rollover EA (3% annual increases from EA10 expiry). Each trajectory represents a realistic career path over a 10-year period (2026–2035), reflecting how individual earnings evolve under each scenario based on fleet changes, promotions, and pay progression rules.

To provide a meaningful and balanced comparison, the analysis covers a 10-year period rather than only the life of the proposed EA. This timeframe captures both the longer-term advantages of the new pay structure and the realistic short-term impacts of snap-back, particularly on the A380, and to a lesser extent the A330. It allows pilots to see how outcomes compound over time, giving a more accurate picture of the agreement’s sustained value rather than a narrow snapshot. A longer horizon was not used, as projections beyond ten years become less relevant and increasingly speculative.

The purpose of these tables is to allow pilots to identify which example most closely aligns with their own likely career path and to assess the overall value of EA11 relative to a rollover outcome.

A reminder that the comparisons shown reflect uplift over a rollover scenario, not total increases relative to current EA10 rates. A comparison to EA10’s existing pay levels would show substantially higher overall pay increases.



Understanding the columns:

Column	Description
Year	The calendar year of the projection (2026–2035).
Category	The fleet and rank held by the pilot for that year (e.g. A330 SO → B787 FO → A350 Captain). Promotions or fleet transitions are reflected here.
EA11 YOT (Years on Type)	The number of consecutive years the pilot has been on that aircraft type (and rank). Under EA11, <i>years on type</i> determines progression through the pay scale for all fleets.
ROL YOS (Years of Service)	Total years of service with the company. Under a rollover scenario, this governs pay progression for most fleets, except the B787. The 787 continues to use <i>years on type</i> to determine progression even under a rollover model, consistent with its existing structure.
EA11 Hourly Rate	The hourly rate for that year under EA11, based on fleet and YOT.
EA11 Total Base Pay	The total annual base pay for that year under EA11 (hourly rate × EA11 credit hours).
Rollover Hourly Rate	The hourly rate that would have applied under a rollover EA10 scenario (3% annual increases applied to current rates).
Rollover Total Base Pay	The total annual base pay for that year under the rollover model (hourly rate × rollover credit hours).
Difference (\$)	The annual difference between EA11 and rollover total base pay. Positive numbers indicate EA11 provides higher pay for that year.



At the end of each trajectory, a **cumulative total** is displayed to show the total 10-year difference, representing the long-term value (or shortfall) of EA11 for that particular career path.

Credit Hour Assumptions

The analysis uses standardised credit hours per annum to reflect differences between fleets and agreements:

Fleet	EA11 Credit Hours	Rollover Credit Hours
A330	1176	1165
A380	1371	1360
A350	1273	1262
B787	1153	1030

The variations between fleet credit hours reflects differences in AFDPs (Additional Flight Duty Payments), as well as other pay-linked credit mechanisms.

The large difference between EA11 Credit Hours and Rollover Credit Hours on the **B787**, is a result of the introduction of 1/3 night credits for both three-crew and four-crew operations under EA11 which results in a substantial increase in credited hours for the same stick time across the year.

For other fleets, the differences between EA11 and Rollover reflect the inclusion of the online training payment and Blank Line Holder (BLH) payments under EA11.

The A350 hours are derived from the projected flying plan over the first five years of operation, providing a realistic baseline for long-term modelling.

As a result, the year-to-year and cumulative outcomes in each trajectory are influenced not only by changes in hourly rate, but also by crediting differences tied to EA11’s revised operational and payment rules.

How to Interpret the Tables

Each of the nine examples demonstrates how different combinations of fleet movements, promotions, and timing can affect individual outcomes:

- **Stable Pathways** (remaining on one fleet and rank) show how EA11 delivers steady, predictable progression.

- **Transition Pathways** (changing fleets or ranks) reveal how EA11’s YOT-based progression interacts with promotional timing.
- **Late-Career Pathways** highlight how progression may plateau differently under EA11 compared to the service-based rollover model.

Together, these trajectories show the practical, cumulative effect of EA11’s proposed structure compared to a simple rollover, allowing each pilot to assess whether the package represents fair value in their circumstances.



Trajectory 1 – Captain A330 (Transition to A380 Captain in 2028)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	Cpt A330	2	372.57	\$438,142	28	374.67	\$436,491	+1,652
2027	Cpt A330	3	393.34	\$462,568	29	385.91	\$449,585	+12,983
2028	Cpt A380	1	415.27	\$569,335	30	438.21	\$595,966	-26,630
2029	Cpt A380	2	438.42	\$601,074	31	451.36	\$613,850	-12,776
2030	Cpt A380	3	462.88	\$634,608	32	464.90	\$632,264	+2,344
2031	Cpt A380	4	495.84	\$679,797	33	478.84	\$651,222	+28,574
2032	Cpt A380	4	510.71	\$700,183	34	493.21	\$670,766	+29,418
2033	Cpt A380	4	526.03	\$721,187	35	508.00	\$690,880	+30,307
2034	Cpt A380	4	541.81	\$742,822	36	523.24	\$711,606	+31,215
2035	Cpt A380	4	558.07	\$765,114	36	538.94	\$732,958	+32,156

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$2,071,119	\$2,095,891	-\$24,772	-1.2 %
2029 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$4,243,711	\$4,089,697	+\$154,014	+3.8 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$6,314,830	\$6,185,588	+\$129,243	+2.1 %

Summary:

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as an A330 Captain and transitions to the A380 Captain in 2028. The initial two years show marginal EA11 gains over a rollover before a temporary dip in 2028–2029 during transition. Thereafter, EA11 delivers consistent and increasing advantages, culminating in a cumulative uplift of approximately **\$227,000 over 10 years** compared to a rollover.



Trajectory 2 – SO A330 (Progression to FO A330, then FO A350)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	SO A330	3	137.48	\$161,676	3	126.70	\$147,606	+14,071
2027	SO A330	4	147.27	\$173,190	4	133.14	\$155,108	+18,081
2028	FO A330	1	254.51	\$299,304	5	235.25	\$274,066	+25,238
2029	FO A330	2	268.70	\$315,991	6	248.21	\$289,165	+26,827
2030	FO A330	3	283.67	\$333,596	7	261.21	\$304,310	+29,286
2031	FO A330	4	299.49	\$352,200	8	288.70	\$336,336	+15,865
2032	FO A350	1	308.48	\$392,695	9	300.28	\$378,953	+13,742
2033	FO A350	2	325.68	\$414,591	10	312.72	\$394,653	+19,938
2034	FO A350	3	343.84	\$437,708	11	325.14	\$410,327	+27,382
2035	FO A350	3	354.16	\$450,846	12	338.72	\$427,465	+23,381

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$950,161	\$865,945	+\$84,216	+9.7 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$2,381,636	\$2,252,042	+\$129,593	+5.8 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$3,331,797	\$3,117,987	+\$213,810	+6.9 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as an **A330 Second Officer**, upgrades to **A330 First Officer in 2028**, and later transitions to the **A350 fleet**. Under EA11, this pathway performs strongly across both the EA and post-EA periods, delivering a **steady uplift throughout**, particularly during the early FO years due to higher hourly rates and crediting.

Over the full 10-year period, EA11 delivers a cumulative benefit of approximately **\$178,000** over a rollover.



Trajectory 3 – FO A330 (Promotion to A350 Captain in 2031)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	FO A330	2	245.90	\$289,178	20	247.21	\$287,999	+1,179
2027	FO A330	3	259.60	\$305,290	21	254.63	\$296,644	+8,646
2028	FO A330	4	274.08	\$322,318	22	262.27	\$305,545	+16,774
2029	FO A330	4	282.30	\$331,985	23	270.13	\$314,701	+17,283
2030	FO A330	4	290.77	\$341,944	24	278.24	\$324,150	+17,795
2031	Cpt A350	1	453.78	\$577,662	25	456.05	\$575,535	+2,127
2032	Cpt A350	2	479.08	\$609,869	26	469.74	\$592,812	+17,057
2033	Cpt A350	3	505.79	\$643,871	27	483.83	\$610,593	+33,277
2034	Cpt A350	3	520.96	\$663,182	28	498.34	\$628,905	+34,277
2035	Cpt A350	3	536.59	\$683,079	29	513.29	\$647,772	+35,307

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$1,248,771	\$1,204,890	+\$43,881	+3.6 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$3,519,607	\$3,379,767	+\$139,840	+4.1 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$4,768,378	\$4,584,657	+\$183,721	+4.0 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as an **A330 First Officer** and promotes to **A350 Captain** in 2031. EA11 delivers modest but steady annual gains as an FO over a rollover, then a stronger acceleration after transition to A350 Captain, supported by the higher rate structure and 5-year flying-plan credit assumptions.

Across the 10-year period, the EA11 structure yields an overall uplift of approximately **\$90 k more than a rollover**, with benefits distributed evenly between the EA and post-EA phases.



Trajectory 4 – A380 Captain (Retires 2030)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	Cpt A380	3	411.26	\$563,837	33	413.05	\$561,748	+2,089
2027	Cpt A380	4	440.54	\$603,980	34	425.45	\$578,612	+25,368
2028	Cpt A380	4	453.76	\$622,100	35	438.21	\$595,515	+26,585
2029	Cpt A380	4	467.37	\$640,763	36	451.36	\$613,850	+26,913
2030	Cpt A380	4	481.39	\$659,986	37	464.90	\$632,264	+27,722

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$2,430,680	\$2,264,724	+\$165,956	+7.3 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$659,986	\$632,264	+\$27,722	+4.4 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$3,090,666	\$2,896,988	+\$193,678	+6.7 %

Summary

This trajectory models an **A380 Captain** remaining on the fleet until retirement in 2030. EA11 provides consistent incremental uplifts each year, with annual differences over a rollover in the range of \$25k–\$28k due primarily to superior hourly rates and crediting arrangements.

Across the five-year period, the cumulative benefit of EA11 amounts to approximately **\$109k**, representing a clear and sustained improvement for pilots completing their careers on the A380 when compared to a rollover.



Trajectory 5 – A330 FO → A330 Captain (promotes 2028, retires 2032)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	FO A330	2	245.90	289,178.40	22	247.21	287,999.65	1,178.75
2027	FO A330	3	259.60	305,289.60	23	254.63	296,643.95	8,645.65
2028	Cpt A330	1	390.44	459,157.44	24	397.48	463,064.20	-3,906.76
2029	Cpt A330	2	407.12	478,773.12	25	409.40	476,956.13	1,816.99
2030	Cpt A330	3	429.82	505,468.32	26	421.69	491,264.81	14,203.51
2031	Cpt A330	4	453.78	577,661.94	27	434.34	548,133.46	29,528.48
2032	Cpt A330	4	467.39	594,991.80	28	447.37	564,577.46	30,414.34

Totals and comparative periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	EA11 Advantage (%)
2026–2029	1,532,398.56	1,524,663.93	7,734.63	0.5%
2030–2035	1,678,122.06	1,603,975.72	74,146.33	4.6%
2026–2035 total	3,210,520.62	3,128,639.65	81,880.97	2.6%

Summary

This pathway shows small EA11 gains as an FO, a slight dip on the first captain year, then some EA11 advantages through 2030–2032 as captain. Over the full window, EA11 is ahead by about \$81.9k (+2.6%), with most of the uplift occurring after 2029. This trajectory shows lower uplift advantages than other trajectories.



Trajectory 6 – B787 First Officer (Promotes to B787 Captain in 2031)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	FO 787	1	258.34	\$297,866	20	274.08	\$282,302	+15,564
2027	FO 787	2	272.75	\$314,481	21	289.36	\$298,041	+16,440
2028	FO 787	3	287.96	\$332,018	22	305.48	\$314,644	+17,373
2029	FO 787	4	304.01	\$350,524	23	322.52	\$332,196	+18,328
2030	FO 787	4	313.13	\$368,241	24	332.19	\$342,156	+26,086
2031	Cpt 787	1	453.78	\$523,208	25	481.41	\$495,852	+27,356
2032	Cpt 787	2	479.05	\$552,345	26	508.25	\$523,498	+28,847
2033	Cpt 787	3	505.79	\$583,176	27	536.60	\$552,698	+30,478
2034	Cpt 787	4	533.98	\$615,679	28	566.51	\$583,507	+32,172
2035	Cpt 787	4	550.01	\$634,162	29	583.51	\$601,015	+33,146

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$1,294,888	\$1,227,183	+\$67,705	+5.5 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$3,276,811	\$3,098,726	+\$178,084	+5.7 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$4,571,699	\$4,325,909	+\$245,789	+5.7 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who serves as a **B787 First Officer** through 2030 and promotes to **B787 Captain** in 2031. The introduction of **1/3 night-crediting for 3- and 4-crew operations** under EA11 substantially increases credited hours compared to rollover conditions, generating a higher annual base even before promotion. Once upgraded, the combined effect of improved crediting and rate progression delivers sustained uplifts across the remainder of the decade.

Across the 10-year span, EA11 provides a cumulative gain of roughly **\$246 k (+5.7 %)**, demonstrating one of the strongest outcomes among the trajectories due to the structural credit-hour improvement unique to the 787.



Trajectory 7 – FO A380 (Promotes to A330 Captain in 2027, then A350 Captain in 2031)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	FO A380	3	271.43	\$372,131	26	272.58	\$370,709	+1,422
2027	Cpt A330	1	379.07	\$445,786	27	385.91	\$449,585	-3,799
2028	Cpt A330	2	395.26	\$464,826	28	397.48	\$463,064	+1,762
2029	Cpt A330	3	417.30	\$490,745	29	409.40	\$476,956	+13,789
2030	Cpt A330	4	440.57	\$518,110	30	421.69	\$491,265	+26,846
2031	Cpt A350	1	453.78	\$577,662	31	456.05	\$575,535	+2,127
2032	Cpt A350	2	467.39	\$594,992	32	469.74	\$592,812	+2,180
2033	Cpt A350	3	505.79	\$643,871	33	483.83	\$610,593	+33,277
2034	Cpt A350	3	520.96	\$663,182	34	498.33	\$628,892	+34,290
2035	Cpt A350	3	536.59	\$683,079	35	513.29	\$647,772	+35,307

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$1,773,487	\$1,760,314	+\$13,173	+0.7 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$3,680,896	\$3,546,870	+\$134,026	+3.8 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$5,454,383	\$5,307,184	+\$147,199	+2.8 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as a **First Officer on the A380**, upgrades to **A330 Captain in 2027**, and transitions again to **A350 Captain in 2031**. EA11 delivers near-neutral results relative to a rollover through the EA period, with modest early gains offset by minor transitional dips during the A330 phase. From 2030 onwards, however, stronger hourly rate growth and the A350's higher credit-hour baseline generate better uplifts.

Across the full decade, EA11 produces an overall cumulative gain of approximately **\$147k (+2.8%)**, demonstrating a marginal improvement over rollover conditions.



Trajectory 8 – SO 787 (Promotes to FO 787 in 2031)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	SO 787	1	140.92	\$162,481	1	145.36	\$149,721	+12,760
2027	SO 787	2	148.77	\$171,532	2	153.46	\$158,064	+13,468
2028	SO 787	3	157.07	\$181,102	3	162.01	\$166,870	+14,231
2029	SO 787	4	165.83	\$191,202	4	171.03	\$176,161	+15,041
2030	SO 787	4	170.80	\$200,867	5	176.16	\$181,445	+19,422
2031	FO 787	1	299.50	\$345,324	6	317.73	\$327,262	+18,062
2032	FO 787	2	316.20	\$364,579	7	335.45	\$345,514	+19,065
2033	FO 787	3	333.83	\$384,906	8	354.14	\$364,764	+20,142
2034	FO 787	4	352.43	\$406,352	9	373.89	\$385,107	+21,245
2035	FO 787	4	363.01	\$418,551	10	385.10	\$396,653	+21,898

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$706,316	\$650,816	+\$55,500	+8.5 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$2,120,577	\$2,000,744	+\$119,833	+6.0 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$2,826,893	\$2,651,560	+\$175,333	+6.6 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as a **B787 Second Officer**, progressing to **B787 First Officer in 2031**. Under EA11, the introduction of **1/3 night credits** for 3- and 4-crew operations significantly boosts credited hours, creating an immediate and compounding advantage over rollover conditions even before promotion. Across both the EA and post-EA periods, EA11 delivers strong annual uplifts over a rollover, averaging **6–8% higher** throughout.

The total 10-year outcome represents a cumulative gain over a rollover of approximately **\$175 k (+6.6%)**.



Trajectory 9 – SO A330 (Promotes to FO A350 in 2033)

Year	Category	EA11 YOT	EA11 \$/hr	EA11 Base Pay	ROL YOS	ROL \$/hr	ROL Base Pay	Δ EA11–ROL (\$)
2026	SO A330	1	130.85	\$153,880	1	116.02	\$135,163	+18,716
2027	SO A330	2	138.15	\$162,464	2	127.88	\$148,980	+13,484
2028	SO A330	3	145.85	\$171,520	3	134.42	\$156,599	+14,920
2029	SO A330	4	156.24	\$183,738	4	141.25	\$164,556	+19,182
2030	SO A330	4	160.93	\$189,250	5	148.35	\$172,828	+16,423
2031	SO A330	4	165.76	\$194,928	6	155.75	\$181,449	+13,479
2032	SO A330	4	170.73	\$200,776	7	160.43	\$186,901	+13,875
2033	FO A350	1	317.74	\$404,483	8	306.28	\$386,525	+17,958
2034	FO A350	2	335.45	\$427,028	9	318.57	\$402,035	+24,993
2035	FO A350	3	354.16	\$450,846	10	331.76	\$418,681	+32,165

Totals and Comparative Periods

Period	EA11 Total Base Pay	Rollover Total Base Pay	EA11 Advantage (\$)	% Uplift
2026 – 2029 (EA period)	\$671,602	\$605,299	+\$66,303	+11.0 %
2030 – 2035 (Post-EA period)	\$1,867,311	\$1,748,419	+\$118,891	+6.8 %
2026 – 2035 (Total)	\$2,538,912	\$2,353,718	+\$185,194	+7.9 %

Summary

This trajectory models a pilot who begins as a **Second Officer on the A330**, progressing to **First Officer on the A350 in 2033**. EA11 produces consistent year-on-year uplifts, driven by pay table improvements. Early gains are particularly strong due to the recalibrated SO rates, with an **11% advantage over a rollover during the EA period** that stabilises at around **6–7% post-EA** once the pilot transitions to the A350.

Overall, EA11 delivers a cumulative 10-year benefit over a rollover of approximately **\$185k (+7.9%)**, with advantages spread across both the SO and FO phases, illustrating how the proposed structure materially improves outcomes for pilots advancing through early- to mid-career stages on this path.



